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We study 1,410 mandatory jurisdiction and 48 discretionary jurisdiction criminal law case
outcomes in cases appealed to the Israel Supreme Court in 2006 and 2007 to assess influ-
ences on case outcomes. A methodological innovation is accounting for factors—case
specialization, seniority, and workload—that modify random case assignment. To the extent
one accounts for nonrandom assignment, one can infer that case outcome differences are
judge effects. In mandatory jurisdiction cases, individual justices cast 3,986 votes and differed
by as much as 15 percent in the probability of casting a vote favoring defendants. Female
justices were about 2 to 3 percent more likely than male justices to vote for defendants
but this effect is sensitive to including one justice. Defendant gender was associated with
outcome, with female defendants about 17 percent more likely than male defendants to
receive a favorable vote on appeal. Our data’s samples of mandatory and discretionary
jurisdiction cases allow us to show that studies limited to discretionary jurisdiction case
outcomes can distort perceptions of judges’ preferences. Justices’ ordinal rank in rate of
voting for defendants or the state was uncorrelated across mandatory and discretionary
jurisdiction cases. For example, the justice who sat on the most criminal cases was the fourth
(of 16 justices) most favorable to the state in mandatory jurisdiction cases but the 12th
most favorable in discretionary jurisdiction cases. This result casts doubt on some inferences
based on studies of judges on discretionary jurisdiction courts, such as the U.S. Supreme
Court, in which only discretionary case outcomes are observed.
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I. Introduction
Studies of the relation between case outcomes and individual judges and their character-
istics abound. A few studies exploit random assignment of judges to cases to explore
individual judge and judicial background effects.1 Most studies work with samples biased by
case selection2 or by available opinions.3 The case selection process, whereby courts choose
the cases they review, often confounds studies of courts of last resort because outcome
patterns vary from patterns in cases without such selection.4
Analyses sensitive to case assignment sometimes rely on random assignment to
support a causal inference of judge effects, but nominally random case assignment systems
often have nonrandom components. Boyd et al. note that “logic and practice counsels
against deeming [purported random assignment] a mechanism for true random selec-
tion.”5 Consistent with this warning, Hall demonstrated that Sunstein et al.’s reliance on
random assignment of U.S. federal circuit court cases6 was not supported.7 Ashenfelter et al.
showed a nonrandom aspect of U.S. federal district court case assignment notwithstanding
the random assignment norm.8
One method of assuring random assignment in analyzed cases is to limit the sample
to subsets of cases that can be verified to have been randomly assigned. Another way of
dealing with nonrandom assignment is to use propensity score matching to assure that cases
judged by groups of interest, such as male and female judges, match on key covariates.9
A third method is to try to account for the nonrandom aspects of the case assignment
1For example, Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Politics and the Judiciary: The
Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. Legal Stud. 257 (1995); Matthew Hall, Randomness
Reconsidered: Modeling Random Judicial Assignment in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 7 J. Empirical Legal Stud.
574 (2010).
2At the trial-court level, most studies ignore the vast bulk of civil case outcomes, which consist of settlements. Since
settlement is the dominant outcome for cases in which plaintiffs succeed, ignoring settlements calls into question
findings of judge and judicial background effects.
3Denise M. Keele, Robert W. Malmsheimer, Donald W. Floyd & Lianjun Zhang, An Analysis of Ideological Effects in
Published Versus Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 6 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 213, 234–36 (2009).
4Jonathan P. Kastellec & Jeffrey R. Lax, Case Selection and the Study of Judicial Politics, 5 J. Empirical Legal Stud.
407 (2008).
5Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 Am.
J. Pol. Sci. 389, 394 (2010).
6Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, Lisa Michelle Ellman & Andres Sawicki, Are Judges Political? An Empirical Analysis
of the Federal Judiciary (2006).
7Hall, supra note 1.
8Ashenfelter et al., supra note 1, at 268–70.
9Boyd et al., supra note 5.
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system.10 This article employs the third method to explore judge and judge characteristic
effects in criminal cases appealed to the Israel Supreme Court (ISC). The ISC employs
random case assignment, subject to departures based on case category specialization,
seniority, and workload.
We find that one can reject the null hypothesis that the judge has no effect. Indi-
vidual justices were as much as 15 percent more likely than other justices to vote for
defendants in criminal appeals. Justices’ gender also was associated with case outcomes,
with female justices being about 2 to 3 percent more likely to vote in favor of defendants,
a result that is sensitive to including one justice. The defendant’s gender was associated with
case outcomes. Female defendants were about 17 percent more likely than male defendants
to receive a favorable ISC justice vote.
Justices’ voting patterns noticeably differed in mandatory and discretionary cases.
This finding has implications for most studies of appellate courts with discretionary juris-
diction. Observing only discretionary cases may not reveal a judge’s true voting preferences
because of the confounding effect of the court selecting cases for review. We thus can
partially test recent concerns expressed about inferring individual justice preferences from
outcomes of discretionary jurisdiction cases.
Section II of this article reviews the relevant literature. Section III describes charac-
teristics of the Israeli judiciary and Section IV describes the data. Section V analyzes the case
assignment process in the ISC to document nonrandom aspects of case assignment to
consider. Section VI presents the results, the limitations of which are discussed in Section
VII. Section VIII concludes.
II. Prior Literature
At least three strands of literature relate to this project. The first is the voluminous literature
on associations between judges, judge characteristics (e.g., race and gender), and case
outcomes. The second is the literature empirically studying the ISC. The third is the
literature on the methodology of studying case outcomes and judge effects.
Individual judge effects have been most studied in relation to criminal sentencing.
Interjudge differences in the United States often are found,11 with reductions in dis-
parity when mandatory federal sentencing guidelines were in effect,12 and increases when
10For example, Joshua D. Angrist & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist’s Companion
63 (2009).
11Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts 9–11 (1998); James M.
Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42
J.L. & Econ. 271 (1999).
12A. Abigail Payne, Does Inter Judge Disparity Really Matter? An Analysis of the Effects of Sentencing Reforms in
Three Federal District Courts, 17 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 337 (1997) (using data from 1980 to 1991 for select types of
cases in three federal district courts); Joel Waldfogel, Aggregate Inter-Judge Disparity in Federal Sentencing: Evidence
from Three Districts, 4 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 151 (1991) (using data from three different district courts from 1984 to
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mandatory guidelines were not applicable.13 Beyond criminal sentencing, many studies
focus on U.S. Supreme Court outcomes and on individual U.S. Supreme Court justices14
and other studies focus on appellate judge characteristics. We are aware of two studies
examining the effect of individual ISC justices on case outcomes: one study examines the
pro-government tendencies of individual justices;15 the second discusses the association of
justices’ religious observancy and outcomes of cases involving freedom of religion.16
Recent studies of gender effects in appellate courts include Choi and colleagues’
finding that, if anything, female judges outperform male judges as measured by opinion
production, outside state citations, and co-partisan disagreements, though many of their
tests yielded insignificant gender effects on judicial performance.17 Boyd et al. use propen-
sity score matching for 13 areas of law addressed in U.S. federal appeals court cases. They
find consistent judge gender effects only in cases involving sex discrimination, with female
judges being more receptive to such cases.18 The prominence of null effects is consistent
with the varying other outcomes reported in the literature.19 Boyd et al. summarize the
literature as follows.
1987); Joel Waldfogel, Does Inter-Judge Disparity Justify Empirically Based Sentencing Guidelines?, 18 Int’l Rev. L. &
Econ. 293 (1998).
13Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (2010). There is
evidence of congressional overreaction to perceived downward departures by judges. Max Schanzenbach, Have
Federal Judges Changed Their Sentencing Practices? The Shaky Empirical Foundations of the Feeney Amendment,
2 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 1 (2005); Scott, supra. Compare Beth A. Freeborn & Monica E. Hartmann, Judicial
Discretion and Sentencing Behavior: Did the Feeney Amendment Rein in District Judges?, 7 J. Empirical Legal Stud.
355 (2010).
14For example, Timothy R. Johnson, James F. Spriggs II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Passing and Strategic Voting on the U.S.
Supreme Court, 39 Law & Soc’y Rev. 349 (2005).
15Yoram Shachar & Miron Gross, Acceptance and Rejection of Appeals to the Supreme Court: Quantitative Analyses,
13 Legal Stud. 329 (1996) (in Hebrew)
16Keren Weinshall-Margel, Attitudinal and Neo-Institutional Models of Supreme Court Decision Making: An Empiri-
cal and Comparative Perspective from Israel, 8 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 556 (2011).
17Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Mirya Holman & Eric A. Posner, Judging Women, 8 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 504
(2011). Boyd, Epstein, and Martin and Greiner and Rubin, echoing earlier work, point out some difficulty in asserting
that any inherent individual characteristic, such as sex or race, causes behavior such as judicial voting patterns. Boyd
et al., supra note 5, at 397; D. James Greiner & Donald B. Rubin, Causal Effects of Perceived Immutable Character-
istics, 93 Rev. Econ. Stat. 775 (2011). Nevertheless, they recognize that it can be interesting to compare people with
such characteristics to see if there are differences in outcome. Boyd et al., supra note 5, at 397 (quoting Donald
Rubin). In the Israeli context, a study performed by Bogoch and Don-Yechiya examined the effect of the presence
of a female justice on the panel on the tendency to accept or reject appeals as well as its impact on sentencing
severity. Bryna Bogoch & Rachelle Don-Yechiya, The Gender of Justice: Bias Against Women in Israeli Courts 133–36
(1999).
18Boyd et al., supra note 5.
19For example, Ashenfelter et al., supra note 1, at 262 n.12.
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By our count, social scientists and legal academics have produced over 30 systematic, multi-
variate analyses of the extent to which female judges make decisions distinct from their male
colleagues (individual effects) or cause male judges to behave differently than they otherwise
would (panel effects). Of these, roughly one-third purport to demonstrate clear panel or indi-
vidual effects, a third report mixed results, and the final third find no sex-based differences
whatsoever.20
This literature thus provides no firm guidance on what to expect in our data, and it provides
little guidance on individual judge effects, in contrast to the effects of judge characteristics,
in mandatory jurisdiction appellate cases.
In the ISC literature, judicial characteristic effects have been found in religion cases.
More religiously observant ISC justices were significantly more likely to support freedom of
religion claims than nonobservant justices.21 Salzberger explored another characteristic,
justices’ acting or permanent status,22 and found differences in case outcomes between
acting and permanent ISC justices.23 Gross and Shachar found the case assignment pattern
in the ISC not to be random, with seniority and case category specialization being sources
of nonrandomness.24 These findings suggest the need to account for the case assignment
pattern in exploring ISC justice or justice characteristic effects.
Methodological issues are of sufficient concern in most appellate studies to limit
strong reliance on their results. One can divide the methodological issues into concerns
about sample bias, case assignment, and inferences based on questionable measures of
uncertainty.
The publicized Sunstein et al. study, which finds political ideological effects across a
broad range of issues in U.S. federal courts of appeal, notes that it is limited to published
opinions. The authors suggest that in courts that limit unpublished opinions to “simple and
straightforward cases . . . it is harmless to ignore unpublished opinions, simply because they
are easy.”25 Since unpublished opinions can far outnumber published opinions, the study,
20Boyd et al., supra note 5, at 392 (footnote omitted). One reason for varying results is that judge and judge
characteristic effects may exist at one court level but not at another due to the selection of cases for appeal. While the
mass of cases may be simple enough to preclude judge characteristics from influencing their outcome, cases appealed
likely tend to be closer cases in which the legal outcome is less clear. In such close cases, there is more room for
judicial characteristics to exhibit an influence. Ashenfelter et al., supra note 1, at 281.
21Weinshall-Margel, supra note 16.
22Justices are sometimes appointed to the ISC on a temporary basis. Some of the justices appointed on a temporary
basis eventually receive permanent status. Others are directly appointed on a permanent basis.
23Eli Salzberger, Acting Justices in the Supreme Court and Judicial Independence—Theoretical Analysis and Empiri-
cal Findings, 19 Bar Ilan L. Rev. 541 (2003). See also Benyamin Blum, To Concur or Not to Concur: That is the
Question: Theoretical and Practical Questions Regarding the Judicial Independence of Judges Appointed Tempo-
rarily to the Israeli Supreme Court, Thesis, Master of the Science of Law, Stanford University (May 2006).
24Miron Gross & Yoram Shachar, How Are Supreme Court Panels Selected?—A Quantitative Analysis, 29 Hebrew
U. L. Rev. 567 (1999).
25Sunstein et al., supra note 6, at 18.
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despite its 6,408 decisions covering different time periods,26 may exclude the mass of cases.
The decision to publish is not necessarily an unbiased one, as shown in one study of judges’
political ideology.27 So at most the Sunstein study tells us something, not unimportant but
of limited use, about the cases that courts think are important and choose to publish.
Sample bias in the cases studied is not a concern here because our data source purports to
cover all ISC appellate outcomes.
Aside from publication bias, studies suffer from unquestioningly assuming random
assignment of appellate judges.28 As the Boyd et al. quote in the introduction indicates, this
can be a mistake. At the trial-court and appellate-court levels, the random assignment
assumption is sometimes not warranted.29 If assignment is not random, the risk arises that
adjudicators receive heterogeneous pools of cases and that the different pools of cases are
associated with the case outcome of interest. Adjudicator effects then may be artifacts of the
case assignment process. The method we use to address this concern, expressly accounting
for the known nonrandom factors in the assignment process, has not been widely used.
The case outcome studies that focus on measures of uncertainty, used here to refer
to standard errors of the estimates, are limited. At the appellate level, nonindependence
exists both with respect to multiple observers (panels of appellate judges) of the same case,
and with repeated observations by the same observer (the judge) across cases. These
features artificially decrease standard errors and promote questionable findings of statisti-
cal significance.30 If one is interested in judge characteristics, such as political party or
gender, the voter-judge’s nonindependence across cases should be considered and not just
the case-level nonindependence.
A second branch of the methodology literature is relevant to what inferences studies
of appellate case outcomes can support. Scholars increasingly recognize that the process of
discretionary case selection can distort inferences about judicial preferences.31 The ISC’s
26Id. at 157–63 nn. 2–26.
27Keele et al., supra note 3. For a study that verified its sample with respect to publication bias, see Richard L. Revesz,
Ideology, Collegiality, and the D.C. Circuit: A Reply to Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, 85 Va. L. Rev. 805 (1999).
28Sunstein et al., supra note 6, at 82–83.
29Ashenfelter et al., supra note 1; Boyd et al. supra note 5; Hall, supra note 1.
30An analogous situation exists with respect to legislative votes. For example, in a study of senatorial voting on U.S.
Supreme Court nominees, the votes of senators on a single nominee are not independent; they are influenced by the
nominee’s qualifications. Shipan notes this issue in the context of Senate voting and adjusts the standard errors to
account for this nonindependence. Charles R. Shipan, Partisanship, Ideology, and Senate Voting on Supreme Court
Nominees, 5 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 55, 62–63 (2008). When one is interested not in the nominal senator’s votes but
in a characteristic of the senator, such as political party, the voter’s nonindependence across cases of legislative votes
needs to be additionally accounted for and not just the nominee-level nonindependence.
31Anna Harvey & Barry Friedman, Ducking Trouble: Congressionally Induced Selection Bias in the Supreme Court’s
Agenda, 71 J. Pol. 574, 574–76 (2009); Kastellec & Lax, supra note 4, at 408 (“[T]he Court’s selection process raises
the potential for selection bias in the inferences we draw from its cases.”); Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher & Issi
Rosen-Zvi, Case Selection and Dissent in Courts of Last Resort: An Empirical Study of the Israel Supreme Court in
Empirical Studies of Judicial Systems 2011 (Yun-chien Chang ed. 2012) (forthcoming).
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mandatory and discretionary jurisdiction in criminal appeals allows us to test this concern.
We can compare individual justices’ behavior across the two jurisdictional sources, one in
which justices select cases and one in which they do not. This has never been done in a
justice-level study of which we are aware.
A final set of relevant articles relates to the effect of the panels on which judges sit.
Panel effects are said to exist when the makeup of the panel suggests voting patterns that
differ from individual judges’ preferences. Thus, for example, a U.S. Republican federal
appellate judge may vote differently depending on whether he or she is paired with two
other Republicans or with a Republican and a Democrat. Revesz’s study of the D.C. Circuit
and Sunstein et al.’s larger study show panel effects.32 We therefore explore panel-level
patterns as part of our analysis.
III. The Israeli Judiciary33
Israel is a unitary state with a single system of courts of general jurisdiction as well as other
tribunals or authorities with judicial power. The institutions other than the traditional
courts have jurisdiction limited by subject matter or persons covered. Of the regular law
courts, the judiciary law establishes three levels of courts: the ISC, district courts, and
magistrates’ courts.34 District courts and magistrates’ courts are trial courts; the Supreme
Court functions as both an appellate court and as High Court of Justice (HCJ). In its HCJ
capacity, the Court operates as a court of first and last instance, primarily in areas relating
to government behavior. Because the HCJ activity is not appellate, this study excludes HCJ
cases, other than partially accounting for them in considering workload.
The 29 magistrates’ courts are the basic trial courts. Magistrates’ courts serve the
locality and district in which they sit. They generally have criminal jurisdiction over
offenses with a potential punishment of a fine or up to seven years’ imprisonment. They
have civil jurisdiction in matters involving up to a specified monetary amount—which
currently is 2.5 million shekels (approximately U.S. $690,000)—as well as over the use,
possession, and division of real property. Magistrates’ courts also serve as traffic courts,
municipal courts, family courts, and small claims courts. Generally, a single judge presides
in each case unless the president of the magistrates’ court directs that a panel of three
judges hear the case.35
32Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717 (1997); Sunstein
et al., supra note 6, at 22–23.
33The Israeli judiciary description is based on the descriptions in Eisenberg et al., supra note 31; Theodore Eisenberg,
Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi, Israel’s Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction: An Empirical Study, 96 Cornell L.
Rev. 693, 700–04 (2011).
34See generally Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744–1984, 38 LSI 271 (1983–1984).
35Courts Law (Consolidated Version) ch. 2, art. 3.
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District courts have residual jurisdiction in matters not within the sole jurisdiction of
another court. The six district courts sit in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, Beersheva, Nazareth,
and Petah-Tikva. The Petah-Tikva court was added in 2007.36 As courts of first instance,
district courts hear criminal cases in which the accused faces punishment of more than
seven years’ imprisonment. District court civil jurisdiction covers matters in which more
than 2.5 million shekels are in dispute. District courts also hear cases dealing with, inter alia,
companies and partnership, arbitration, prisoner petitions, and appeals on tax matters, and
serve as administrative courts. These courts also hear appeals of judgments of the magis-
trates’ courts. Generally, a panel is composed of a single district court judge. A panel of
three judges hears appeals of magistrates’ courts’ case judgments and hears cases in the first
instance when the accused is charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment of 10 or
more years. A three-judge panel also sits when the president or deputy president of the
district court so directs.37
The ISC has jurisdiction to hear criminal and civil appeals from judgments of the
district courts. Cases that begin in a district court are appealable, as of right, to the ISC.
Other matters, particularly the mass of cases that begin in the magistrates’ courts, are
appealable only with the ISC’s permission. The Supreme Court’s decisions are binding on
lower courts and Israel adheres to the principle of stare decisis.38
The ISC generally sits in panels comprised of three justices. The president or the
deputy president of the Court may expand the panel size to any uneven number of
justices but that happened rarely enough in our data to not require further consider-
ation. Each panel also has the power to decide to expand its size. The Court can also
decide to initiate a “further hearing,” in which a panel of five or more justices rehears a
case decided by a smaller ISC panel. A single justice may hear petitions for injunctions,
temporary restraining orders, and other interim rulings, as well as for an order nisi, but
a single justice may not refuse to grant an order nisi or make it contingent on only some
of its assertions. A single justice may hear appeals against interim rulings of district courts
or against the verdict of a single district court judge hearing an appeal from a case in a
magistrate’s court.39
Courts sitting on appeal, whether district courts or the ISC, are formally authorized
to adjudicate both fact and law, but seldom intervene in factual matters and tend to limit
their judgment to questions of law. The rationale is that, on appeal, judges usually are not
directly exposed to witnesses and other types of evidence. The appellate court may examine
whether the factual basis for the lower court’s decision has a sound evidentiary foundation,
but the de facto appeal practice is not one of a de novo review. Mandatory criminal appeals
36Ordinances of Courts (Establishment of the Central District Court), 2007, KT 6585, 824. In results not reported
below, we assessed whether screening outcomes in the ISC differed based on the district court being reviewed. We
found no significant differences.
37Courts Law (Consolidated Version) ch. 2, art. 2.
38Basic Law: Judicature § 20.
39Courts Law (Consolidated Version) §§ 26, 30.
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are regulated in a slightly different manner than civil appeals under Israeli law. We describe
only the criminal appeals process here and refer the reader to our description of civil
appeals elsewhere.40
In criminal cases, a verdict issued by the district court sitting in the first instance can
be appealed as of right to the ISC.41 A verdict issued by the magistrates’ court in the first
instance can be appealed as of right to the district court. In Israel, both prosecution and
defense have symmetric rights of appeal, as the prosecution is authorized to appeal a
defendant’s acquittal.42
In a case initiated in the magistrates’ court and appealed as of right to the district
court, both the prosecution and the defense can petition the ISC for a second appellate
review. Unlike the situation in civil cases, interim trial court decisions in criminal cases
cannot be appealed, with only limited exceptions such as judicial disqualification.43
The requirements of discretionary appeal laid down in Chenion Haifa v. Matzat Or44
apply to criminal and civil cases.45 Under this standard, the result reached by the lower
court should not influence the decision whether to grant or deny a discretionary appeal.
Therefore, according to the law on the books, an argument made by the defendant
concerning the stigmatizing effect of conviction46 or even the severity of punishment is
not grounds for a second appellate review.47
A request for discretionary appeal is usually reviewed by a single justice, but it can also
be reviewed by a panel of three justices.48 When the request for appeal is reviewed by a
three-justice panel, the panel is authorized to treat the request for appeal as an appeal and
decide on the merits.49 As discussed above, discretionary appeals are based, in most cases,
on a preliminary screening by a single justice, a process we explore elsewhere.50
40Eisenberg et al., Cornell, supra note 33.
41See Courts Law (Consolidated Version) § 41(a).
42Israeli law, which does not differentiate between appeals of acquittals and convictions, grants the prosecution the
authority to appeal a defendant’s acquittal. For discussion of this authority, see Eisenberg et al., Cornell, supra note
33, at 783 n.52.
43Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version), 5742–1982, 36 LSI 35, §§ 146–147 (1981–1982).
44CA 103/82 Chenion Haifa v. Matzat Or 36(3) PD 123 [1982].
45See DC 4927/92 State of Israel v. Ben Yehuda (unpublished opinion).
46CrimA 1245/93 Shtarkman v. State of Israel 47(2) PD 177 [1993].
47DC 3251/91 Yishai v. State of Israel, PD 45(5) 441 (1991). Our prior work calls into question adherence to the
Chenion Haifa standards. Eisenberg et al., Cornell, supra note 33.
48Criminal Procedure Rules, 5734–1974, § 44(7).
49Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version), 5742–1982, 36 LSI 35, § 205 (1981–1982).
50Eisenberg et al., supra note 31.
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IV. The Data and Descriptive Statistics
This study uses a data set employed in two earlier studies of ISC appellate cases, which
include discussions of the data’s limitations.51 We describe here relevant aspects of the
original data set and report additional coding activity with respect to the data.
The cases included in this study are: (1) for discretionary and mandatory jurisdiction
criminal cases, all cases decided in the years 2006 and 2007; and (2) for discretionary and
mandatory civil cases, all cases decided in 2007 and all cases decided in the months of
August through December 2006. The study includes every ISC substantive opinion available
online via the official Israel Judicial Authority (IJA) website for all cases decided in these
time periods. Since the IJA website contains all the cases decided by the ISC,52 the resulting
database provides a complete picture of ISC doctrinal decisional activity in the periods
covered. We tested the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the database by comparing
it with data obtained from the ISC’s secretariat. This comparison suggested that the
data obtained from the IJA website are indeed comprehensive, covering the full gamut of
criminal and civil cases.
The cases identified by the above methods were coded by student research assistants.
Prior to the student coding, the authors designed a data form to structure the coding. After
review of the performance of the form and the students in an initial set of cases, the form
was revised and a final form constructed. The students used that revised form to code the
cases, under the supervision of the authors.53
In reviewing the data in preparing our article on screening by individual justices, we
corrected some errors in the coding of case outcomes, eliminated interlocutory appeal
cases, and removed a few duplicate observations. For purposes of this article, with its greater
focus on individual justice activity in decisions on the merits, we verified each justice’s
participation in each case, recorded the presiding justice in each case that reached a
three-judge panel, and removed two additional cases as duplicate observations. The result-
ing usable sample contains 3,342 cases consisting of 940 discretionary criminal appeals,
1,410 mandatory criminal appeals, 395 discretionary civil appeals, and 597 mandatory civil
appeals. Fewer cases may be reported in tables due to missing data for a variable included
in a table. We also used the IJA website to identify the workload of individual justices, as
measured by case participation, in HCJ cases.
51Eisenberg et al., Cornell, supra note 33; Eisenberg et al., supra note 31.
52The website does not include cases decided in camera, but since those cases are an insubstantial fraction of the cases
decided by the Court, the omission does not materially affect the analysis here. See Courts Law (Consolidated
Version), 5744–1984, 38 LSI 271, § 70(a) (1983–1984).
53Preliminary results indicated that the coding of case categories in our original data differed from the case categories
that the ISC uses internally to assign discretionary jurisdiction cases to individual screening justices. In preparing
Eisenberg et al., supra note 31, which focused on screening decisions by individual justices, we reviewed every
discretionary case in the original data to reclassify the cases into categories more relevant to screening by individual
justices.
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Because of the importance of case categories in understanding both the ISC case
assignment process and case outcomes, we first present, in Table 1, a summary of the
individual justices’ participation in cases by jurisdictional source and case type. The table’s
“Total Appellate” columns are the number and percent of cases the justice sat on. Table 1
reports justices’ participation at the individual-justice level. Because each merits panel
contains, with few exceptions, three justices, the number of cases represented by the “Total”
row’s numbers are approximately one-third the numbers shown in the table.
Table 2 presents individual characteristics of justices in this study. The ISC included
six female and four acting justices.54
54We had no desire to identify individual justices and, in prior work, did not do so when it was unnecessary to
presenting the results of interest about the ISC. Eisenberg et al., supra note 31. In this article, institutional details
about justices, such as when they were appointed, opinion assignments, and who were the presiding justices, made
Table 1: Justices’ Participation on Merits Appellate Panels and High Court of Justice
Cases, by Jurisdictional Source and Type of Case
Justice
Discretionary Jurisdiction Mandatory Jurisdiction
Criminal Civil Criminal Civil
Total
Appellate
High Court
of Justice
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Arbel 18 10.9 16 10.2 373 8.9 112 6.6 519 8.4 525 7.5
Barak 1 0.6 4 2.5 47 1.1 40 2.4 92 1.5 144 2.1
Beinisch 8 4.8 2 1.3 156 3.7 40 2.4 206 3.3 514 7.3
Berliner 6 3.6 4 2.5 282 6.7 69 4.1 361 5.8 240 3.4
Elon 5 3.0 4 2.5 181 4.3 92 5.4 282 4.5 205 2.9
Fogelman 4 2.4 2 1.3 182 4.3 30 1.8 218 3.5 639 9.1
Grunis 6 3.6 15 9.6 183 4.4 200 11.8 404 6.5 576 8.2
Hayut 8 4.8 5 3.2 228 5.4 234 13.9 475 7.7 549 7.8
Joubran 23 13.9 17 10.8 464 11.1 117 6.9 621 10.0 610 8.7
Kheshin, D. 5 3.0 10 6.4 202 4.8 66 3.9 283 4.6 270 3.9
Levy 28 17.0 4 2.5 864 20.6 36 2.1 932 15 507 7.2
Melcer 4 2.4 0 0.0 88 2.1 44 2.6 136 2.2 51 0.7
Naor 5 3.0 12 7.6 164 3.9 168 9.9 349 5.6 541 7.7
Other 1 0.6 4 2.5 30 0.7 24 1.4 59 1.0 — —
Procaccia 15 9.1 13 8.3 147 3.5 85 5.0 260 4.2 593 8.5
Rivlin 5 3.0 31 19.7 151 3.6 213 12.6 400 6.4 442 6.3
Rubinstein 23 13.9 14 8.9 454 10.8 119.7 7.0 610 9.8 592 8.5
Total 165 100 157 100 4,196 100 1,689 100 6,207 100 6,998 100
Note: For each jurisdictional source (discretionary and mandatory) and type of case (criminal and civil), the first
column is the number of votes on the merits cast by the row justice and the second column is the percent of votes cast
by that justice in cases of the source and type. The percents are thus column percents. For example, Justice Arbel cast
18 of the 165 the votes cast on the merits in discretionary criminal cases, and the second column shows them to be
10.9 percent of the votes cast in such cases. Votes in discretionary cases are limited to those in which three-judge
panels granted review. For discretionary and mandatory criminal cases, the data include all cases decided on the
merits in the years 2006 and 2007. For discretionary and mandatory civil cases, the data include all cases decided in
2007 and all cases decided from August through December 2006. For HCJ cases, the data include cases decided in
2006 and 2007.
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Summary statistics for case-level and justice-level variables used in this study, limited
to mandatory criminal cases, are in Table 3. “Government appealed” is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the government appealed and 0 if the defendant appealed. “Female defen-
dant” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a female defendant appealed and 0 if a male
defendant appealed, and is coded only for cases in which we could ascertain gender from
the defendant’s name. “Arab appealed” is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an Arab defen-
dant appealed and 0 if a Jewish defendant appealed, and is coded only for cases in which
we could ascertain ethnicity from the defendant’s name. “Sentencing only” is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the appeal was only of the sentence and 0 otherwise. “Panel senior-
ity” is the sum of the times served on the ISC of the justices sitting on a panel. “Presiding
justice seniority” is the time, in years, of the ISC of a panel’s presiding justice. “Time on
ISC” is the time, in years, of individual justices’ service on the ISC at the time of the ISC
decision.
The outcome variables of interest are “case resolved for defendant” at the case level
and “vote for defendant” at the individual-justice level. “Case resolved for defendant” is
whether the appeal was resolved in favor of the defendant. “Vote for defendant” is a variable
recording the direction of each justice’s vote as a dummy variable. It can differ from the
case’s outcome if a justice dissents, which rarely occurs in the ISC in the time period
identification unavoidable to achieve coherent presentation of results. We take no position on whether individual
justices’ voting patterns are normatively desirable.
Table 2: Justices’ Characteristics
Justice Time Joined Court Gender Status
Arbel May 2004 Female Permanent
Barak September 1978 Male Permanent
Beinisch December 1995 Female Permanent
Berliner June 2006 Female Acting
Elon April 2007 Male Acting
Fogelman April 2007 Male Acting
Grunis April 2002 Male Permanent
Hayut March 2003 Female Permanent
Joubran April 2003 Male Permanent
Kheshin, D. June 2006 Male Acting
Levy September 2000 Male Permanent
Melcer August 2007 Male Permanent
Naor June 2001 Female Permanent
Procaccia March 2001 Female Permanent
Rivlin September 1999 Male Permanent
Rubinstein May 2004 Male Permanent
Note: Justice Barak served as President Justice until his retirement in
September 2006, at the mandatory retirement age of 70. He was
replaced by the then most senior justice, Justice Beinisch. Justices who
sat in very few cases during the time period of this study are not shown;
their numbers can be seen in the “Other” row in Table 1. Justice Fogel-
man became a permanent member of the ISC in 2009.
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studied.55 A case outcome favors the defendant if it affirms an appeal brought by the state
or reverses an appeal brought by the defendant. About 4.5 percent of mandatory jurisdic-
tion criminal case votes are excluded because they involved votes, such as approved in part
and denied in part, that we did not characterize as favoring the defendant or the state.
Unlike the other variables, “workload” is not precisely known to us; nor do we know
how it influences the ISC’s case assignment system. We consider two measures of justices’
workloads. A justice’s workload is estimated in part based on (1) the time taken by each
justice’s cases, (2) an adjustment for our sample including more months of criminal than
civil cases (relevant due to subject matter specialization), and (3) an adjustment for those
justices who did not serve on the ISC for the full period of our study. A second measure of
workload is the number of cases in which each justice wrote the Court’s opinion. Within the
same case, workload varies across justices based on who wrote the Court’s decision, as shown
in Table 7, and based on whether a justice wrote a dissenting or concurring opinion.
Separate opinions do not materially affect the workload because separate opinions are
so rare.56 Our workload estimates are based on the ISC’s appellate activity, a limitation
discussed in Section VII.57
55Eisenberg et al., supra note 31.
56Id.
57The workload estimate starts with a measure of workload attributable to the cases justices sat on. Table 5 shows
that cases vary substantially in the workload they impose (as measured by time to resolution) depending on
whether a case is civil or criminal in type, and on whether a case’s jurisdiction in the ISC is mandatory or
discretionary. We initially estimate workload by summing, for each justice, the time to resolution for all the cases
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Mandatory Criminal Cases
Mean Median Minimum Maximum SD N
A. Case-Level Variables
Government appealed 0.133 0 0 1 0.340 1,398
Female defendant appealed 0.020 0 0 1 0.140 1,400
Arab defendant appealed 0.443 0 0 1 0.497 1,080
Sentencing only 0.674 1 0 1 0.469 1,410
Panel seniority 12.4 11.1 0 46.5 5.638 1,410
Presiding justice seniority 3.8 2.8 0 28.3 5.051 1,393
Panel workload 25.4 26.4 0 31.9 4.609 1,410
Year of ISC decision 2006.6 2007 2006 2007 0.493 1,410
Case resolved for defendant 0.1595 0 0 1 0.366 1,341
B. Justice-Level Variables
Vote for defendant 0.161 0 0 1 0.368 3,991
Time on ISC 4.2 3.8 0 28.3 3.662 4,163
Workload 8.6 9.2 3.4 11.1 2.202 4,157
Note: SD = standard deviation; N = number of observations. The number varies because some variables are observed
at the individual-justice level and others are observed at the case level. Variables are described in the text. Seniority
and time are in years. Workload is in hundreds of years. Time on ISC and workload include all justice participations
on panels so justices are multiply observed.
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Since the probability of obtaining appellate relief may be associated with particular
crimes, we constructed a taxonomy of crimes. We coded each of the 1,410 mandatory
criminal cases using the offense types described in Table 4 and shown in more detail in
Appendix Table A. The taxonomy used is derived in part from the categories of crimes used
by the Israeli police to categorize offenses, which is available in the Statistical Abstract of
on which he or she sat. We then make two adjustments. Since we undersampled civil cases relative to criminal
cases, this initial sum is adjusted for the civil cases not in our sample. Justices sat on such cases but receive no
“credit” for that work in our initial summation because we did not observe these cases. We therefore multiply civil
case times to resolution by 24/17 to reflect our sample design, which includes 24 months of criminal cases and 17
months of civil cases. We then adjust for six justices not serving for the full two years of our study. Justice Barak
left the Court in mid-September 2006 and, as Table 2 shows, five justices joined the Court during our study period.
Simply summing these justices’ cases’ times to resolution would distort workload’s role in their case assignments
because they could not have accumulated workload credit while not on the Court. We adjust their workloads by the
inverse of the fraction of the 24 months of our study that they served on the Court. This in effect treats them as
having a workload that reflects their time on the Court. This ex post workload calculation can only be a proxy for
the workload’s effect on case assignment, which likely occurs in real time based on justices’ estimated pending
workloads at the time of each case filing.
Table 4: Major Subject of First Crime Mentioned in ISC Opinions
Major Subject of Crime N
National security, foreign affairs, official state secrets—1 18
Offenses against the regime and the society—2 63
Offenses against the government and the legal system—3 16
Offenses against good governance—4 6
Body injuries—5 765
Subcategories of the 765 “Body injuries” cases
Causing death—33 170
Endangering the life and health of others—36 271
Sex offenses—37 228
Offenses against another’s freedom—39 40
Assault—40 37
Other 19
Property crimes—6 236
Forgery of currency and stamps—7 0
Minor offenses—8 0
Preparation and conspiracy to commit a crime—9 101
White-collar crimes—10 13
Drugs—11 82
Administrative offenses—12 0
Other offenses—13 13
No information in opinion 97
Total 1,410
Note: The table shows the number times each offense category was the first offense mentioned in an ISC opinion in
mandatory criminal cases. The numbers in the column with the crime category text are internal coding references.
More detailed offense categories are shown in Appendix Table A.
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Israel.58 Table 4 shows the frequency of the first offense mentioned in each mandatory
criminal case appeal.
V. Case Assignment in the ISC and Its Implications
Interpreting the results reported below depends on understanding the ISC case assign-
ment process. If case assignment were fully random, then case outcome differences across
judges would be judge effects and not a consequence of justices seeing different mixes
of cases.59 Randomization should account for differences in case characteristics, includ-
ing the strength of the appellant’s case. If the case assignment process is somehow cor-
related with the merits, then it is more difficult to distinguish between judge effects and
effects attributable to case differences. If case assignment is random conditional on char-
acteristics (covariates) used to assign cases, then analysis that controls for these charac-
teristics likely provides reasonable estimates of justices’ effects on case outcomes.60 We
therefore explore the pattern of case assignment before presenting results. Our strategy
for estimating individual justice effects is to try and ascertain covariates on which case
assignment is based and to account for those covariates in assessing justices’ patterns
of voting.
Discussions with persons knowledgeable about the ISC and empirical work by Gross
and Shachar, described above, suggest three sources of nonrandomness in assigning ISC
appellate cases. First, justices specialize by subject area, with evidence of relevant subjects
being criminal, civil, and subcategories of civil cases. So specializing justices, particularly
presiding justices, receive a higher fraction of cases in their specialty than would occur due
to random assignment. Second, cases are assigned based on some measure of workload or
availability. So justices with portfolios of cases that are more burdensome may be less likely
to be assigned other cases. Third, presiding justices are assigned to cases based on special-
ization and seniority. So randomization of case assignment likely would be applied sepa-
rately to the senior justice on a panel and then to the two remaining junior justices. These
factors are consistent with the results reported in Gross and Shachar. We therefore explore
the relations between case assignment and (1) case category specialization, (2) workload,
and (3) seniority.
58For example, Files Opened by the Police, by Type of Offence, Statistical Abstract of Israel 2011 (tbl. 11.3), available
at <http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/shnaton/templ_shnaton_e.html?num_tab=st11_03&CYear=2011>.
59For example, Ashenfelter et al., supra note 1, at 259.
60Sometimes, the assignment to a treatment is known to be random for some subgroup. Dan A. Black, Jeffrey A.
Smith, Mark C. Berger & Brett J. Noel, Is the Threat of Reemployment Services More Effective Than the Services
Themselves? Evidence from Random Assignment in the UI System, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 1313 (2003); Angrist &
Pischke, supra note 10, at 63. We assume that, conditional on case specialization, seniority, and workload, case
assignment in the ISC is random. Our analysis is therefore in the spirit of models in which the subgroup is known
to be randomly assigned, but we have more to account for with respect to the assignment process because it is based
on multiple factors.
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A. Case Category Specialization
Table 1 shows the justices’ participation on merits panels by jurisdictional source and type
of case. The data are consistent with the reported case category specialization in the
assignment processes. We show elsewhere that two justices, who we identify here as Justices
Levy and Joubran, accounted for over 80 percent of the discretionary jurisdiction criminal
case screening decisions.61 Appendix Table B confirms this by including discretionary
cases denied review in a table similar to Table 1. Table 1 and Figure 1 confirm that spe-
cialization continues in postscreening merits decisions. The column percents for criminal
cases show that Justice Levy dominated participation in criminal case merits panels. He
accounted for 17 percent of all votes in discretionary criminal cases and 20.6 percent of
all votes in mandatory criminal cases. Since almost all merits panels contain three judges,62
these percentages are out of a maximum single-judge percentage of 33.3 percent of total
votes. Justice Levy thus participated in over half the criminal case decisions for both
jurisdictional sources.
Justice Joubran participated in about one-third of both discretionary and mandatory
jurisdiction criminal cases. Note that this is substantially lower than his share of criminal
cases screened,63 a differential that likely results from Justice Levy having been designated
the senior justice on cases that reach merits panels.
Civil case assignments confirm specialization by subject area. For example, Justice
Rivlin accounted for 12.6 percent of mandatory civil case votes. This prominence stems
from his dominance in tort cases, in which he cast 22 percent of the votes, thus indicating
that he adjudicated two-thirds of the mandatory civil tort cases. Justices Hayut and Grunis
had the highest participation in mandatory civil cases.
Table 1’s “Total Appellate” columns show that Justices Barak, Beinisch, Elon,
Fogelman, and Melcer participated in well under their proportionate share of merits
panels. This is because Justice Barak retired in September 2006 and, as shown in Table 2,
because Justices Elon, Fogelman, and Melcer joined the Court in 2007, and therefore could
not have participated in our sample’s 2006 cases. But Justice Fogelman nevertheless had the
highest number of HCJ participations. Justice Kheshin served for only 10 months beginning
in June 2006 and thus understandably has a proportionately lower share of cases. Justice
Beinisch became Chief Justice in 2006, probably leading to a reduction in her case assign-
ments due to administrative duties. Justice Procaccia’s large shares of discretionary criminal
and civil cases and of HCJ cases may be why she had relatively low shares of mandatory civil
and criminal cases.
The jurisdictional basis of the case need not alter the desire to exploit justices’
expertise via case specialization. Consistently with the specialization hypothesis, the data
show that case category specialization exists for both mandatory and discretionary cases.
61Eisenberg et al. supra note 31.
62A trivial number of criminal case panels involved more than three justices.
63Eisenberg et al. supra note 31.
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This can be seen in Figure 1, which shows the association between the proportion of
mandatory and discretionary cases heard by each justice. Figure 1A shows criminal cases
and Figure 1B shows civil cases. For example, Justice Levy participated in a higher fraction
of criminal cases than any other justice, with participation in over 40 percent of discretion-
ary cases in which review was granted, and over 20 percent of mandatory cases. It also shows
that almost all justices’ fractions of mandatory criminal cases increased as their fraction of
discretionary cases increased. Equally important, the figures’ upper-left and lower-right
Figure 1: Justices’ shares of mandatory and discretionary cases.
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Note: The figures show the relation between each justice’s share of mandatory and discretionary cases. Each justice
is a data point. The top figure reports criminal cases and the bottom figure reports civil cases. In the bottom figure,
the number under each justice’s name is the number of discretionary jurisdiction cases heard by the justice. Thus the
outliers in Figure 1B are not merely justices with very few cases.
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quadrants are nearly empty. Justices were not assigned high proportions of mandatory cases
in an area and low proportions of discretionary cases in the same area, or vice versa.
Specialization spans jurisdictional source. We address the outliers in Figure 1B below in the
discussion of workload.
B. Case Assignment, Workload, and Seniority
Table 1 and Figure 1 establish case category specialization, one source of nonrandom case
assignment. Table 1 shows the workload burden on justices as measured by number of
cases. All cases are not equally burdensome. Discretionary cases denied review presumably
on average take less work than those granted review. Mandatory cases may take longer
because the ISC is the first appeal in such cases, rather than the second appeal in discre-
tionary cases. In second appeals, district courts have already provided review and an
appellate record. That record simplifies the issues presented to the ISC and should reduce
the time needed for adjudication.
Measuring justices’ workloads thus is more complex than counting cases. One might
assign cases in different categories different workload weights based on the time they
consume.64 Table 5 shows the time to disposition by jurisdictional basis (mandatory or
discretionary), review status (granted or denied), and case type (criminal or civil). The time
in days shown is the time from the date of the district court decision being appealed to the
time of the ISC’s disposition. The table shows that discretionary criminal cases denied
review take the least amount of time to adjudicate. These cases far outnumber (828 to 56)
discretionary criminal cases that are granted review. Mandatory civil and criminal cases take
longer than their discretionary jurisdiction counterparts, perhaps, as suggested above,
because no prior appeal record exists.
In addition to what is reported in Table 5, the differing workload of one subset of
cases within the category of mandatory criminal cases should be noted. The 948 mandatory
64For example, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts: Annual Report
of the Director 26 (2010) (for purposes of caseload analysis, “[t]he Federal Judiciary has employed techniques for
assigning weights to cases since 1946.”).
Table 5: Time to Disposition of ISC Cases
Jurisdiction and Type Review Status Mean Days Median Days N
Mandatory criminal Not applicable 428 322 1,400
Mandatory civil Not applicable 805 721 594
Discrectionary criminal Granted 393 291 56
Discretionary civil Granted 694 571 58
Discrectionary criminal Not granted 106 62 828
Discretionary civil Not granted 255 194 336
Total 401 267 3,272
Significance p < 0.001
Note: The table shows the time to disposition, measured by the time from the date of decision of the district court
decision being appealed to the date of the ISC’s disposition of the case.
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criminal cases involving only sentencing issues took on average 358 days to disposition
compared to 574 days for the 452 mandatory criminal cases not limited to sentencing
issues.65 This is important because workload influences case assignment and we show below
that case assignment is not random for sentence-only cases. This may be because of their
distinctive workload.
Evidence of workload variation also exists within the category of mandatory juris-
diction criminal cases. Table 6 shows, for each justice, the mean and median time to
disposition for these cases. For example, the table shows that the median time ranged
from 231 days for Justice Fogelman to 479 days for Justice Barak and the variation across
justices is highly statistically significant. These disposition times are not precise measures
of individual justice performance; the justices sit in panels and therefore do not individu-
ally fully control case processing time. In addition, justices have different mixes of
sentence-only cases and other cases. But the time variation does suggest that, regardless of
cause, a justice’s availability can be a function of the particular group of cases he or she
has pending. Whether the time variation exists because of the difficulty of the case, the
panel’s speed in processing cases, the justice’s speed in processing cases, or a combination
of factors does not matter. A justice with a larger backlog of pending cases may be less
likely to be assigned a newly filed case.
65These figures are based on the cases that reported data allowing for the time computation.
Table 6: Time to Case Disposition for Each Justice,
Mandatory Jurisdiction Criminal Cases
Mean Median N
Arbel 369 291 370
Barak 586 479 43
Beinisch 502 380 151
Berliner 395 326 282
Elon 381 304 180
Fogelman 315 231 181
Grunis 489 360 182
Hayut 471 379 228
Joubran 403 307 463
Kheshin, D. 449 342 202
Levy 384 287 860
Melcer 335 262 88
Naor 476 381 163
Procaccia 522 381 145
Rivlin 435 371 147
Rubinstein 403 327 453
Total 413 322 4,138
Significance p < 0.001 p < 0.001
Note: The table shows the time to disposition, measured by the time
in days from the date of decision of the district court decision being
appealed to the date of the ISC’s disposition of the case, of each justice’s
mandatory jurisdiction criminal cases.
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An individual justice’s work within a case also varies. As noted above, the justice
assigned to write the opinion must invest more time than the other justices on the panel.
Opinion assignment is not random. For example, as Table 7 shows, in mandatory criminal
cases, Justice Levy wrote over 50 percent of the sentencing case opinions and nearly
one-third of the other mandatory criminal case opinions. Opinion assignment is strongly
associated with presiding justice status. In about 58 percent of the mandatory jurisdiction
criminal cases with an ascertainable individual justice responsible for the opinion, the
presiding justice and the opinion justice were the same.66
The workload features help explain the observed pattern of case assignments. Justice
Joubran’s large fraction of discretionary criminal cases may reflect their relatively low
burden. His location in Figure 1A is most striking in relation to Justice Levy, the other
justice who shared the bulk of the criminal case workload, including individual screening,
and a justice who also sat on many discretionary criminal cases. Justice Levy had a much
higher relative share of mandatory cases than Justice Joubran. Justice Joubran may not have
had as high a share of mandatory criminal cases because Justice Levy was often the senior
66This equivalence varied from 63 percent in sentence-only cases to 47 percent in other mandatory jurisdiction
criminal cases.
Table 7: Frequency and Share of Opinion Assignments, Mandatory Jurisdiction
Criminal Cases
Non-Sentence-Only
Cases
Sentence-Only
Cases Totals
No. % No. % No. %
Arbel 40 8.8 46 4.9 86 6.2
Beinisch 16 3.5 11 1.2 27 1.9
Berliner 37 8.1 35 3.7 72 5.2
Court 26 5.7 72 7.7 98 7.0
Elon 28 6.2 12 1.3 40 2.9
Fogelman 9 2.0 18 1.9 27 1.9
Grunis 7 1.5 23 2.4 30 2.2
Hayut 6 1.3 15 1.6 21 1.5
Joubran 20 4.4 37 3.9 57 4.1
Kheshin, D. 21 4.6 15 1.6 36 2.6
Levy 148 32.6 493 52.4 641 46.0
Naor 21 4.6 20 2.1 41 2.9
Other 8 1.8 12 1.3 20 1.4
Procaccia 18 4.0 29 3.1 47 3.4
Rivlin 14 3.1 25 2.7 39 2.8
Rubinstein 35 7.7 77 8.2 112 8.0
Total 454 100 940 100 1394 100
Note: For each type of case (non-sentence-only and sentence-only), the first column is the number of opinions
written by the row justice and the second column is the percent of all opinions written for that case type. The percents
are thus column percents. For example, Justice Arbel wrote 40 of the 454 opinions in non-sentence-only mandatory
criminal cases, and the second column shows them to be 8.8 percent of the opinions in such cases. Opinions not
attributable to an individual justice appear in the “Court” row.
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justice on merits panels, Justice Joubran was not, and seniority is a nonrandom aspect of
case assignment, presiding justice status, and opinion assignment. Since mandatory cases
far outnumber discretionary cases granted review, Justice Levy’s increased mandatory case
workload is likely compensated for in part by assigning Justice Joubran other classes of
cases. Justice Joubran’s share of discretionary criminal cases was about the same as Justice
Levy’s and, as Figure 1B and Table 1 show, Justice Joubran had much higher shares of both
mandatory and discretionary civil cases than Justice Levy. His workload relative to Justice
Levy thus appears to have been adjusted by assignment to these other categories of cases.
Given the workload burden of mandatory civil cases, justices with large shares of such
cases may be assigned a relatively smaller share of discretionary civil cases. This would help
explain Justice Hayut’s location in Figure 1B, with the highest share of mandatory civil cases
and a much smaller share of discretionary civil cases. Similar reasoning helps explain the
civil case shares of Justices Grunis and Naor.67 Justice Rivlin’s tort expertise68 likely accounts
for his high share of both mandatory and discretionary civil cases. Tort accounts for
the largest proportion, 19.3 percent, of civil cases. A system that tends to assign tort cases
to Justice Rivlin would lead to his having high shares of mandatory and discretionary
civil cases.
The departures from random assignment based on case expertise, workload, and
seniority need not be associated with the strength or other characteristics of cases. If that is
so, these factors do not undermine inferences based on the assumption that justices are
assigned cases in ways that are not associated with outcomes or other key covariates. To the
extent one can account for these characteristics in statistical analysis, it enhances the
reasonableness of inferring justices’ effects on case outcomes.
C. Assessing Random Assignment Based on Observable Case Factors Other Than Subject Area
and Time
We can further explore the randomness of assignment by assessing whether justices’ shares
of cases with characteristics observable in our data significantly vary, given their shares of
cases in an area. For example, if a case characteristic is present in 30 percent of the
mandatory criminal cases, the best point estimate for the proportion of cases with that
characteristic on which each justice sits is 30 percent.69 This expected constant proportion
characteristic is not undermined by case category specialization. That Justice Levy sat on
many more mandatory criminal cases than other justices does not mean that the proportion
67As noted above, we excluded from our analysis interlocutory appeals, which arise largely in discretionary jurisdiction
civil cases. To assess the importance of this exclusion, we analyzed 79 cases retrospectively identified as interlocutory
appeals. Eisenberg et al., Cornell, supra note 33, at 708 n.75. Justice Grunis did the vast majority of the screening in
these cases, 90.8 percent. This may help account for his relatively low share of discretionary civil cases shown in
Figure 1B. The workload imposed by these cases appears to be substantially lower than that in other discretionary civil
cases. We had information on the time to disposition for 77 of the cases and they had a mean time of 203 days with
a median time of 129 days.
68Eisenberg et al., supra note 31.
69Ashenfelter et al., supra note 1, at 268–70.
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of cases he sat on with any particular characteristic should exceed the proportion of cases
with that characteristic that other justices hear.
To illustrate, the Tel-Aviv District Court accounted for about 29 percent of the
mandatory criminal cases in our sample. Assuming the district court appealed from is not
associated with a case’s workload on appeal, random assignment conditional on case
category and workload suggests that Tel-Aviv cases should not significantly vary from being
29 percent of each justice’s share of mandatory criminal cases. This is the case, both for
senior justice assignment and for other justices. Similarly, random assignment conditional
on case category and workload suggests that each justice’s share of appeals by plaintiffs (the
government in criminal cases) and defendants should not significantly vary from the overall
proportion of appeals by plaintiffs and defendants. Nor should we observe significant
variation in the justices’ shares of appeals by female defendants compared to justices’ shares
of all mandatory criminal appeals.70
Table 8 explores this aspect of the case assignment pattern for mandatory criminal
cases. The party structure in criminal cases, unlike civil cases,71 is simple, with only defen-
dants and governments as parties, with the overwhelming majority of defendants being
individuals, and with the two actors always appearing on consistent sides of the case. One
can interpret justices’ votes in criminal cases as tending to favor either the defendant or the
government. Judge effects in discretionary cases can be confounded by the case selection
process.72 We therefore limit most of our subsequent analysis to mandatory criminal cases.
Civil case data contribute to the analysis in allowing us to identify case specialization and to
analyze workloads, and discretionary criminal case data allow us to compare justices’ voting
patterns in the two classes of criminal cases.
Table 8 shows the proportion of each justice’s mandatory jurisdiction criminal
appeals that consist of (1) government appeals, (2) appeals by female defendants, (3)
appeals by Arab defendants compared to Jewish defendants, and (4) appeals limited to
sentencing.
The pattern for three of the covariates in Table 8 is consistent with random assign-
ment of mandatory jurisdiction criminal cases. The table’s last row shows that the justices’
proportions of government appeals, female appellant cases, and Arab appellant cases73 do
70These expected null effects are analogous to those suggested in testing for randomness in a study of mandatory
appeals. Hall, supra note 1, at 577–78. He focused on the explanatory variable of interest in that study, political
party.
71The distribution of civil case characteristics, with their more complex party structures than criminal cases, are more
difficult to assess. A civil case appellate outcome can favor confounding combinations of litigants—individuals (men
and women) or entities, governments or private parties. The litigant categories can appear as plaintiffs or defendants,
a further possible confounding factor. Eisenbeg et al., Cornell, supra note 33.
72Eisenberg et al., supra note 31; Kastellec & Lax, supra note 4.
73Justice Barak’s low share of Arab appellant cases is likely partly attributable to his retirement from the ISC in
September 2006. The proportion of mandatory criminal Arab defendant cases was higher in 2007 (45.3 percent) than
in 2006 (42.8 percent), though not significantly so. This also may help explain his low proportion of Arab appellant
cases in Table 11, which focuses on presiding justices.
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not statistically significantly vary. Evidence of nonrandomness exists, however, in cases
involving sentence-only appeals. This may be related to the differential workload burden in
such cases, noted above, compared to appeals on the merits or to another aspect of case
specialization. Given this pattern, we account for this nonrandom feature in analyzing case
outcomes below.
Table 9 explores the case assignment pattern for mandatory criminal cases by major
offense subject. It includes the five most frequent major offense subjects reported in
Table 4. The offense subjects included in Table 9 account for about 89 percent of the cases
in the sample. The table does not support rejection of the hypothesis of random case
assignment across the major subject offenses.
Similar analysis can be conducted at the justice-characteristic level in addition to the
individual-justice level, as reported in Table 10. The key justice characteristic explanatory
variables, female justice and acting justice, show two significant departures from random-
ness for Table 10’s observable characteristics. Sentence-only cases comprised 65.7 percent
of female justices’ mandatory criminal case participations and 68.9 percent of male justices’
Table 8: Covariate Proportions of Each Justice’s Mandatory Criminal Case Docket
Government
Appellant
Female
Appellant
Arab
Appellant Sentence-Only
Arbel 0.136 0.016 0.457 0.681
Barak 0.178 0.043 0.300 0.489
Beinisch 0.132 0.007 0.429 0.590
Berliner 0.135 0.011 0.507 0.706
Elon 0.083 0.039 0.475 0.613
Fogelman 0.095 0.011 0.445 0.742
Grunis 0.154 0.038 0.430 0.617
Hayut 0.114 0.013 0.444 0.640
Joubran 0.159 0.020 0.450 0.728
Kheshin, D. 0.149 0.015 0.457 0.644
Levy 0.128 0.020 0.458 0.725
Melcer 0.069 0.023 0.449 0.818
Naor 0.141 0.018 0.403 0.598
Other 0.100 0.033 0.565 0.700
Procaccia 0.150 0.027 0.390 0.667
Rivlin 0.129 0.007 0.325 0.616
Rubinstein 0.132 0.029 0.438 0.656
Total 0.132 0.020 0.444 0.679
No. of observations 4,162 4,137 3,191 4,196
Significance 0.493 0.385 0.299 0.000
Note: The table shows the proportion of each justice’s mandatory criminal cases that contain the column charac-
teristic. Observations are at the justice, not case, level so they are approximately three times the number of cases. The
number of observations in the columns varies because unknown or unavailable information varies by the column
characteristic. The number of mandatory criminal cases for each justice is shown in Table 1. Chi-squared tests
are used for column significance levels; the accuracy of the test for the female appellant column is limited by sparse
cell counts.
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mandatory criminal case participations (p = 0.046), again suggesting the need to account
for sentence-only cases in analyzing case outcomes.
Although acting justices tended to receive more Arab defendant cases than perma-
nent justices, this difference is not evidence of nonrandom assignment. Arab defendant
Table 9: Each Justice’s Proportion of Major Offense Subjects, Mandatory Criminal
Case Docket
Offenses Against
the Regime and
the Society Body Injuries Property Crimes
Preparation and
Conspiracy to
Commit a Crime Drugs
Arbel 0.054 0.520 0.158 0.056 0.072
Barak 0.000 0.574 0.277 0.021 0.043
Beinisch 0.045 0.551 0.141 0.051 0.032
Berliner 0.067 0.535 0.149 0.046 0.117
Elon 0.039 0.580 0.155 0.077 0.039
Fogelman 0.038 0.593 0.170 0.066 0.066
Grunis 0.066 0.492 0.169 0.082 0.044
Hayut 0.048 0.544 0.145 0.079 0.048
Joubran 0.032 0.506 0.177 0.095 0.069
Kheshin, D. 0.035 0.545 0.173 0.074 0.040
Levy 0.043 0.544 0.166 0.088 0.058
Melcer 0.034 0.534 0.193 0.068 0.045
Naor 0.043 0.549 0.201 0.061 0.030
Other 0.067 0.533 0.267 0.000 0.100
Procaccia 0.020 0.537 0.197 0.061 0.082
Rivlin 0.060 0.550 0.166 0.079 0.053
Rubinstein 0.044 0.590 0.165 0.064 0.040
Total 0.044 0.544 0.168 0.072 0.058
No. of observations 186 2,283 706 303 245
Significance 0.181
Note: The table shows the proportion of each justice’s mandatory criminal cases that consist of the major offense
indicated by the columns. Observations are at the justice, not case, level so they are approximately three times the
number of cases. Offense subjects with relatively few cases are excluded due to sparse cell counts. A chi-squared test
is used for the table’s significance level; the accuracy of the test is limited by a few sparse cell counts but is robust to
their exclusion.
Table 10: Covariate Proportions for Justice Characteristics, Mandatory Criminal
Case Docket
Government
Appellant
Female
Appellant
Arab
Appellant Sentence-Only
Female justice 0.134 0.015 0.448 0.657
Male justice 0.131 0.023 0.443 0.689
Significance of male/female difference 0.798 0.062 0.797 0.046
Acting justice 0.119 0.018 0.475 0.679
Permanent justice 0.135 0.021 0.437 0.678
Significance of acting/permanent difference 0.092 0.467 0.013 0.971
Note: The table shows, for the justice characteristics in a row, the proportion of mandatory criminal cases that
contain the column characteristic. Significance levels are adjusted for nonindependence of observations within cases.
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cases comprised 47.5 percent of acting justices’ cases compared to 43.7 percent of perma-
nent justices cases (p = 0.013). But the proportion of Arab defendant cases increased from
2006 to 2007, the two years covered by our criminal case data, a time period during which
the proportion of cases heard by acting justices also increased. Justice Barak, the most
senior justice, retired in 2006 and acting justices in our data were all recent appointees.
These facts explain the lower proportion of Arab defendant cases heard by permanent
justices.74 In addition, since Table 14 suggests that Arab defendant status is uncorrelated
with case outcomes, the modest imbalance is not a concern.
D. Presiding Justices
Each appellate panel contains a presiding justice, a nonrandom status because it is based on
seniority. The ISC presidency is held by the Court’s most senior member. By ISC custom,
the president is the presiding justice in cases on which the president sits and the deputy
president, the second most senior justice, is the presiding justice in cases on which the
deputy president sits and the president does not. In other cases, the justice on the panel
with the longest ISC tenure presides. The case assignment process may seek to assure that
a senior justice serves as presiding justice, in which case the choice of presiding justice
would not be random. The role of seniority and the existence of a presiding justice may
help explain why Justice Levy is so dominant in criminal cases and Justice Rivlin is domi-
nant, albeit to a lesser extent, in civil cases. After President Justice Beinisch, Justices Rivlin
and Levy are the two most senior justices on the Court.
Among the presiding justices, we can assess the pattern of assignment in a manner
similar to that for individual justices. Table 11, again limited to mandatory criminal cases,
shows the same case characteristics as Tables 8 and 10, but the rows are now presiding
justices on cases rather than all justices.
The presiding justice table (Table 11) is generally consistent with the individual
justice table. The shares of justices’ dockets consisting of government appeals and
Arab defendant appeals do not significantly differ from those appeals proportions of all
cases. The shares of female defendant appeals do differ significantly, but barely
(p = 0.046), and this seems to be a seniority effect because Table 8 shows no significant or
near-significant difference in the justices’ shares of female appeals. As in Table 8, a sig-
nificant sentence-only case effect exists. A table similar to Table 9 for presiding justices’
74Another significant difference with respect to Arab defendants exists for seniority, also likely related to Justice
Barak’s retirement and the low-seniority acting justices, combined with an increasing portion of Arab defendant
cases. Justices who heard Arab defendant cases had on average 3.9 years of seniority on the Court. Justices who
heard Jewish defendant cases had on average 4.3 years of seniority on the Court, a significant difference
(p = 0.007). We control for seniority in our analysis of case outcomes as it is a factor acknowledged to be a basis
for nonrandom case assignment. As Table 10 shows, female defendant cases comprised 1.5 percent of female
justice cases and 2.3 percent of male justice cases, a near-significant difference. Since, as shown below, female
defendants tend to fare better on appeal than male defendants, this pattern of case assignment should bias
our results against finding a pro-defendant female justice effect, suggesting that results may be a bit stronger
than reported.
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proportion of major offense categories, not reported here, did not yield statistically
significant differences.75
Table 11 suggests the need to account for seniority in analyzing case outcomes. The
most junior justices during the time of our study, Melcer, Fogelman, Danziger, Berliner,
and Kheshin, do not appear in the presiding justice table, presumably because of seniority
or acting justice status. Whatever the reason, having a position in each case panel assigned
by seniority is a source of nonrandomness in case assignment.
VI. Results
Section V identifies nonrandom aspects of ISC case assignment. It also suggests that useful
proxies are available for known nonrandom influences. This section presents two sets of
results. The first set explores justice and case characteristics in relation to justices’ votes.
The second set exploits estimates of justices’ tendencies to compare the differences in
justices’ tendencies in mandatory versus discretionary jurisdiction cases. For most discre-
tionary jurisdiction courts of last resort, justices’ tendencies in the mass of cases are never
observed. Only their votes in cases they select are observable. Their views in the mass of
cases are manifested in usually unobserved decisions to grant or deny review.
75But the difference was nearly significant (p = 0.053) and was largely attributable to Justice Levy being the presiding
justice in a relatively large share of cases involving “preparation and conspiracy to commit a crime.”
Table 11: Covariate Proportions of Panels’ Presiding Justice’s Mandatory Criminal
Case Docket
Government
Appellant
Female
Appellant
Arab
Appellant Sentence-Only
Arbel 0.143 0.045 0.473 0.615
Barak 0.182 0.044 0.308 0.511
Beinisch 0.143 0.000 0.431 0.613
Grunis 0.167 0.056 0.477 0.648
Levy 0.120 0.019 0.477 0.740
Naor 0.125 0.000 0.458 0.569
Procaccia 0.160 0.032 0.384 0.691
Rivlin 0.126 0.008 0.340 0.612
Rubinstein 0.149 0.021 0.429 0.553
Total 0.132 0.020 0.445 0.679
No. of cases 1,383 1,385 1,072 1,394
Significance 0.907 0.046 0.186 0.000
Note: The table shows the proportion of each presiding justice’s mandatory criminal cases that contain the column
characteristic. Since only one presiding justice sits on each case, observations are at the case level. The number of
observations in the columns varies because unknown or unavailable information varies by the column characteristic.
Fisher’s exact test is used for the female appellant column. A chi-squared test is used for the other columns.
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A. Justice and Case Characteristic Results
With respect to justice and case characteristics, we first present results in tables that show
the relation between mandatory criminal case outcomes and: (1) individual justices, (2)
justice characteristics aggregated across individual justices, (3) defendant characteristics,
and (4) three-judge panels. We then report regression results that account for the known
nonrandom aspects of the case assignment process assessed in Section V, while simulta-
neously including the covariates—justices and litigant characteristics—of primary interest.
We account for case specialization by limiting most of the analysis to mandatory criminal
cases and by accounting for nonrandomness in the assignment of sentence-only cases in the
regression analyses. We account for seniority and workload through variables in the regres-
sion analysis and further account for seniority by presenting panel-level results. The com-
position of panels, with their inclusion of a presiding justice, is not random, as shown by
several justices who do not appear in Table 11’s list of presiding justices.
1. Justice-Level Results
Table 12 shows the mandatory criminal case votes for each justice in the study. The
dominant pattern is that the state is overwhelmingly more successful than criminal defen-
dants, both in cases appealed by defendants and in cases appealed by the state. The lowest
rate at which any justice votes in favor of the state is 72.1 percent, as shown in the
penultimate column. Since the highest rate is 88.1 percent, the spread is substantial—about
seven cases out of ten for the state versus about nine cases out of ten, but not as dominant
as the trend of agreement. The mean and median outcome is about eight cases out of ten.
So the most extreme justices differ from each other in about two cases in ten and from the
center in about one case in ten.76
2. Justice Characteristic and Defendant Characteristic Results
Table 13 shows justice and case characteristics, divided by whether justices voted for the
defendant or for the state. It shows a tendency of female justices to vote with defendants
more than male justices and for acting justices to vote with defendants less than permanent
justices.
The female justice tendency to vote for defendants more than male justices emerges
in both cases appealed by the government (p = 0.043) and in cases appealed by defendants
(p = 0.109) but was stronger in cases appealed by the government.77 The acting justice
tendency to vote for the government more than nonacting justices emerges in both cases
76Our results provide new insights, but also confirm some results reported by a 1996 Shachar-Gross study with respect
to previous compositions of the ISC. In a study of 7,147 ISC cases representing 40 percent of all cases published in the
years 1948–1994, it was found that while all justices exhibited pro-government tendencies, significant variation existed
among the individual justices. Shachar & Gross, supra note 15, at 351–55.
77The Bogoch and Don Yechiya study did not find a significant gender effect on appeal outcome. Their study,
however, encompassed a relatively small number of cases and the number of female justices in the relevant time
period (1988–1992) was much smaller (only two justices). Bogoch & Don-Yechiya, supra note 17, at 133–36.
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Table 12: Justices’ Votes in Mandatory Criminal Appeal Cases
Justice
Defendant Appealed State Appealed
Vote Favored
State
Vote Favored
Defendant
Voted to
Affirm
Voted to
Reverse
Voted to
Affirm
Voted to
Reverse
Arbel 86.5% 13.5% 25.0% 75.0% 84.9% 15.1%
262 41 12 36 298 53
Barak 75.0% 25.0% 14.3% 85.7% 76.7% 23.3%
27 9 1 6 33 10
Beinisch 86.2% 13.9% 35.0% 65.0% 83.3% 16.7%
112 18 7 13 125 25
Berliner 85.6% 14.4% 15.8% 84.2% 85.4% 14.6%
202 34 6 32 234 40
Elon 86.9% 13.1% 7.1% 92.9% 87.4% 12.6%
133 20 1 13 146 21
Fogelman 88.8% 11.2% 18.8% 81.3% 88.1% 11.9%
135 17 3 13 148 20
Grunis 81.9% 18.1% 28.0% 72.0% 80.5% 19.5%
118 26 7 18 136 33
Hayut 78.5% 21.5% 16.7% 83.3% 79.1% 20.9%
150 41 4 20 170 45
Joubran 84.8% 15.2% 20.0% 80.0% 84.1% 15.9%
319 57 14 56 375 71
Kheshin, D. 83.0% 17.0% 20.0% 80.0% 82.6% 17.4%
137 28 6 24 161 34
Levy 85.8% 14.2% 11.8% 88.2% 86.1% 13.9%
624 103 12 90 714 115
Melcer 87.5% 12.5% 16.7% 83.3% 87.2% 12.8%
70 10 1 5 75 11
Naor 73.5% 26.5% 36.4% 63.6% 72.1% 27.8%
97 35 8 14 111 43
Other 77.8% 22.2% — 100% 80.0% 20.0%
21 6 0 3 24 6
Procaccia 80.7% 19.3% 15.8% 84.2% 81.2% 18.8%
96 23 3 16 112 26
Rivlin 84.6% 15.5% 5.3% 94.7% 85.9% 14.1%
104 19 1 18 122 20
Rubinstein 84.0% 16.0% 17.2% 82.8% 83.9% 16.1%
316 60 10 48 364 70
Total 84.2% 15.8% 18.4% 81.6% 83.9% 16.1%
2,920 547 95 424 3,344 642
Significance 0.012 0.185 0.003
No. of cases 1,164 177 1,341
Note: For each justice, the first row is the percent of cases with an affirmance or reversal vote and the second row is
the number of cases with either kind of vote. Justices who voted in few cases are combined as “Other.” The sum of row
percentages may exceed 100 percent due to rounding. The last two columns combine the information in the first four
columns. In the last two columns, a vote favors the state if it is to affirm an appeal brought by a defendant or reverse
an appeal brought by the state. A vote favors the defendant if it is to affirm an appeal brought by the state or reverse
an appeal brought by the defendant. The number of observations in the “Total” row differs from the number of cases
because the data are reported at the justice level and, with few exceptions, three justices hear each case. Because the
justices sit on panels of three, significance levels are adjusted for nonindependence of observations within cases.
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appealed by the defendants (p = 0.055) and in cases appealed by the state (p = 0.439).78 The
effect was of similar strength in both classes of cases but was more significant in cases
appealed by defendants, likely because of the much greater number of such appeals.
Table 14 shifts from justice characteristics to defendant characteristics. A striking
result is the difference between the rates of votes favoring male and female defendants.
Table 14 shows that 41.2 percent of votes in female defendant cases favored defendants
compared to 17.6 percent of votes favoring defendants in male defendant cases, a highly
statistically significant difference. No substantial difference emerged between Arab and
Jewish defendants.
In shifting from justice to defendant associations with case outcomes, an unobserved
case selection mechanism becomes relevant. Female defendants may have different criteria
for seeking to appeal than male defendants. Appellate outcome patterns can be a conse-
quence of which cases are appealed rather than of appellate judge behavior.79 So the ISC
78This finding is interesting in light of the Salzberger study, which found that judicial independence (defined as
rulings against the government) correlates with an acting justice’s chances of obtaining a permanent position. See
Salzberger, supra note 23.
79Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further Exploration of
Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 659, 677–82 (2004); Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S.
Farber, Why Do Plaintiffs Lose Appeals? Biased Trial Courts, Litigious Losers, or Low Trial Win Rates? Princeton
Univ., Industrial Relations Section, Working Paper #567 ( July 2011).
Table 13: Justice Characteristics and Mandatory Criminal Case Outcomes
A. Categorical Characteristics
Percent Pro-Defendant
Votes
Percent Pro-State
Votes N Significance
Female justice 18.1 81.9 1,282 0.025
Male justice 15.2 84.8 2,709
Acting justice 14.3 85.7 804 0.036
Permanent justice 16.6 83.4 3,187
B. Continuous Characteristics
Mean [95% CI] for
Pro-Defendant Votes
Mean [95% CI] for
Pro-State Votes N Significance
Time on court 4.35 [4.09–4.62] 4.14 [4.03–4.25] 3,958 0.121
Workload 8.48 [8.31–8.65] 8.67 [8.60–8.74] 3,949 0.036
Note: CI = confidence interval. The justices sit on panels of three and the results are presented at the individual-
justice level, so the number of cases is approximately one-third of the number of observations in the N column. A
justice’s vote is pro-defendant if it is to affirm an appeal brought by the state or to reverse an appeal brought by the
defendant. Time on court is in years. Workload is in hundreds of years. Time on court is the average time, in years,
across all cases and justices within a case, of the time from the district court decision appealed from to disposition of
the case by the ISC. The workload measure is described above in connection with Table 3. Significance levels are
adjusted for nonindependence of observations within cases. For continuous characteristics, significance levels are
obtained by logistic regression of the dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the justice voted for the defendant and 0 if
the justice voted for the government.
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female defendant effect may be a consequence of which cases parties choose to appeal. It
is also plausible that females are convicted of a different set of crimes than males, with
different reversible potential. It is not obvious, however, why district courts would be
regarded by the ISC as erring more in female defendant cases than in male defendant
cases. We found no within-group effect in the ISC, which would consist of female justices
treating female defendants more favorably or male justices treating male defendants more
favorably.
3. Panel-Level Results
With 16 justices in our study who sat in panels of three, 560 different three-judge panels
were theoretically possible, with downward adjustment for justices who did not overlap in
their tenure on the Court, and upward adjustment for the few cases heard by justices not in
our tables. The actual number of possible panels is limited by the nonrandom factors of
specialization, seniority, and workload. We found 199 distinct three-judge panels in man-
datory criminal cases, too many to report separately, and many of which had too few cases
to be of interest. Table 15 reports case outcomes for the three-judge panels with at least 15
cases. The 565 cases adjudicated by these panels account for about 35 percent of the
mandatory criminal case panels. The panels appear in decreasing order of cases favoring
defendants (the fourth numerical column). The range of outcomes across the frequent
panels is broader than the individual justices’ spread, ranging from 33.3 percent votes for
defendants to 2.8 percent.
Individual justice patterns across panels are worth noting. Justice Berliner appeared
on the panels most favorable and least favorable to defendants, as shown in the first and last
rows of Table 15. This may reflect her acting justice status leading to a tendency to agree
with other panel members.80 Justice Arbel appeared on the panels that are tied for first and
80Two previous studies attempted to assess the independence of the individual justices by examining the tendency of
acting justices to dissent before and after attaining tenure. Both studies found no significant correlation between the
acting justice status and the tendency to dissent. See Salzberger, supra note 23; Blum, supra note 23, at 73.
Table 14: Defendant Characteristics and Mandatory Criminal Case Outcomes
Percent Pro-Defendant
Votes
Percent Pro-State
Votes N Significance
Female defendant 41.2 58.8 102 0.001
Male defendant 17.6 82.4 4,053
Arab defendant 17.3 82.7 1,435 0.743
Jewish defendant 18.1 82.0 1,795
Note: Justices sit on panels of three and the results are presented at the individual-justice level. So the number of
cases is approximately one-third of the number of observations in the N column. A justice’s vote is pro-defendant if
it is to affirm an appeal brought by the state or to reverse an appeal brought by the defendant. A vote favors the state
if it is to affirm an appeal brought by the defendant or reverse an appeal brought by the state. Gender results include
only cases in which gender was determinable from the defendant’s name. Ethnicity results include only cases in which
Arab or Jewish ethnicity was determinable from the defendant’s name. Significance levels are adjusted for noninde-
pendence of observations within cases.
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are the fourth most favorable to defendants but also appeared on the two panels least
favorable to defendants. Justice Rubinstein appeared on the panels most favorable to
defendants and on the panels second and third least favorable to defendants. As suggested
by his frequency of participation in criminal cases shown in Table 1, Justice Levy appeared
on so many panels that only two of the most frequent panels do not include him. The most
common panels range in outcomes across a broad spectrum, but it is the two panels most
favorable to defendants that do not include him. Justice Joubran, also as suggested by
Table 1, appeared on many of the most common panels but on none of the four most
extreme panels, either pro-defendant or pro-government.
If one treats the frequent Levy-Joubran pairing as a control pair, then one can order
the other justices in mandatory criminal cases based on the pro-defendant rate in cases in
which they sat on panels with those two justices. By this measure, Justices Grunis and
Rubinstein were most favorable to defendants and Justices Fogelman and Elon were least
favorable to defendants. Justices Berliner’s and Fogelman’s positions may be most precisely
Table 15: Outcomes for Most Common Panels, Mandatory Criminal Cases
Panel
Cases Favoring State Cases Favoring Defendant Total
No. % No. % No.
Beinisch Rubinstein Berliner 12 66.7 6 33.3 18
Arbel Hayut Naor 14 66.7 7 33.3 21
Levy Grunis Joubran 14 70.0 6 30.0 20
Levy Arbel Hayut 11 73.3 4 26.7 15
Levy Joubran Rubinstein 24 75.0 8 25.0 32
Levy Hayut Kheshin 19 79.2 5 20.8 24
Levy Rubinstein Fogelman 21 84.0 4 16.0 25
Levy Joubran Berliner 52 85.2 9 14.8 61
Levy Elon Rubinstein 15 88.2 2 11.8 17
Levy Kheshin Rubinstein 23 88.5 3 11.5 26
Levy Joubran Kheshin 23 88.5 3 11.5 26
Levy Arbel Fogelman 24 88.9 3 11.1 27
Levy Berliner Rubinstein 42 89.4 5 10.6 45
Levy Hayut Melcer 19 90.5 2 9.5 21
Levy Joubran Elon 37 94.9 2 5.1 39
Levy Joubran Fogelman 58 95.1 3 4.9 61
Levy Melcer Rubinstein 23 95.8 1 4.2 24
Levy Arbel Rubinstein 24 96.0 1 4.0 25
Levy Arbel Berliner 35 97.2 1 2.8 36
Total 490 86.7 75 13.3 565
Note: For the two pairs of column outcomes (favoring state or defendant), the first column is the number of cases
adjudicated by the row panel and the second column is the percent of cases adjudicated by that panel with the column
outcome. A case outcome favors the state if it affirms an appeal brought by a defendant or reverses an appeal brought
by the state. A case outcome favors the defendant if it affirms an appeal brought by the state or reverses an appeal
brought by the defendant. Only panels with at least 15 mandatory criminal cases are shown. Panels are presented in
descending order of percent of cases favoring defendant. The 565 outcomes shown account for 35.1 percent of
mandatory criminal cases satisfying our outcome criteria. A chi-squared test of significance yields p = 0.002, which is
not fully reliable due to sparse cell counts. For the mandatory criminal case outcomes adjudicated by panels not in
the table, 139 of 776 outcomes (17.9 percent) favored defendants. The difference in the rate of cases favoring
defendants between the panels in the table and the less frequently occurring panels not in the table is significant at
p = 0.023.
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estimated because they sat on panels with Justices Levy and Joubran more than any other
justices. This measure is incomplete in that not all justices had enough cases with Justices
Levy and Joubran to appear in the table with them, given its cutoff of at least 15 cases.
Justices Berliner’s and Fogelman’s much more frequent combination with Justices Levy and
Joubran may reflect a practice of grouping acting or junior justices with senior justices.
a. Individual Justices. The panel-level analysis tends to confirm the results of the individual
justice analysis reported in Table 12 for those justices who appear in both tables. Justices
Naor, Hayut, and Grunis were the three most favorable to defendants in Table 12 who also
appear in the panel table and were relatively favorable to defendants in the panel-level
analysis. Justices Fogelman, Melcer, and Elon were the three most favorable to the state in
Table 12 and were relatively favorable to the state in Table 15.
b. Female Justices. The panel-level analysis provides mixed evidence of the pro-defendant
female justice effect suggested in Table 13. Two of the four most pro-defendant panels had
a majority of female justices or consisted of all female justices. But the two panels least
favorable to defendants also had one or two female justices. Table 16 explores the panel-
level female justice effect further by showing the votes cast as a function of the number of
female justices on panels. The pro-defendant trend is monotonically increasing in the
number of female justices and is statistically significant (p = 0.011).81
c. Acting Justices. The panel-level analysis is consistent with Table 13’s result of acting
justices (Berliner, Elon, Fogelman, and Kheshin) tending to vote for the government.
The only two frequent panels on which Justice Elon participated favored defendants
at a rate lower than the overall 13.3 percent rate of frequent panels’ pro-defendant
outcomes. Justices Fogelman and Kheshin served on two panels with less than 13.3 percent
81This significance level is based on a logistic regression model that controls for sentence-only cases, panel seniority,
workload, and individual seniority in mandatory criminal cases. A simple nonparametric test for trend yields p = 0.019.
Table 16: Voting by the Number of Female Justices on Panels, Mandatory Criminal Cases
No. of Female Justices
Votes Favoring State Votes Favoring Defendant
Total Votes Total PanelsNo. % No. %
0 1124 86.3 178 13.7 1302 440
1 1445 84.0 276 16.0 1721 578
2 647 81.5 147 18.5 794 265
3 132 75.9 24.1 24.1 174 58
Total 3,348 83.9 643 16.1 3,991 1,341
Note: For each column vote (favoring state or defendant), the first column is the number of votes cast by the row
panel and the second column is the percent of votes cast. A vote favors the state if it is to affirm an appeal brought
by a defendant or to reverse an appeal brought by the state. A vote favors the defendant if it affirms an appeal brought
by the state or reverses an appeal brought by the defendant.
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pro-defendant outcomes and one panel with more. When grouped with the baseline pair of
Justices Levy and Joubran, each of Justices Kheshin, Elon, and Fogelman participated in
cases with lower than average pro-defendant rulings. Justice Berliner’s cases when sitting
with Justices Levy and Joubran had an above-average pro-defendant outcome rate but not
far above the average.
d. Presiding Justices. The frequent panels reported in Table 15 account for only about 35
percent of the mandatory jurisdiction criminal cases. A presiding justice sits in each case
and, based on seniority or expertise, might exert an influence on other justices in ways not
observable in Table 15. Such an effect emerges with respect to Justice Levy. When he was
the presiding justice, other justices on the panel voted for defendants 13.4 percent (188 out
of 1,400) of the time. When he was not the presiding justice, other justices voted for
defendants 19.3 percent (304 out of 1,762) of the time, a difference significant at p < 0.001.
A similar effect was not observed when the two other most frequent presiding justices,
Justices Beinisch or Rivlin, presided in mandatory criminal cases. Justice Levy himself did
not significantly differ in the rate of voting for defendants based on his presiding justice
status. When he was the presiding justice, he voted for defendants 13.4 percent (94 out of
700) of the time. When he was not the presiding justice, he voted for defendants 16.3
percent (21 out of 129) of the time, a difference significant at p = 0.389.
Justice Beinisch’s appearance on one of the most pro-defendant frequent panels has
an additional interesting feature. Table 12’s first two columns show that Justice Beinisch did
not tend to vote more than other justices for defendants in defendant appeals. Her rate of
voting to reverse in such cases was lower than the whole Court’s mean reversal rate. But
Table 12’s second two columns show that she tended to vote for defendants more than
other justices in government appeals. In this sense, she tended to side with her lower court
colleagues when the government appealed their rulings. This tendency is responsible for
her being ranked in the first row of Table 15.
4. Regression Results
Since individual justice effects, case characteristic effects, and defendant characteristic
effects may simultaneously affect outcomes, we use regression models that allow accounting
for these factors. The models in Table 17 employ a dependent variable that equals 1 if a
justice voted for the defendant and 0 if the vote was for the state. Since the dependent
variable is dichotomous, we use logistic regression. Model (1) includes dummy variables for
the justices and a dummy variable for sentence-only cases, which Tables 8 and 11 show do
not satisfy a random assignment pattern. It also includes a dummy variable for female
defendant cases, shown to be associated with case outcomes in Table 14. Since seniority is
a nonrandom aspect of case assignment, we account for it. We construct a panel-level
variable, panel seniority, equal to the sum of the three-panel justices’ years on the Court.
This variable is added in Model (2). Model (3) adds a variable to account for the workload
of the justices sitting on a panel. Since presiding justice status and opinion-writing burden
are associated with seniority, we rely on our seniority measure to account for these aspects
of workload. Models (4) to (6) use the same variables as Models (1) to (3) but limit the
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Table 17: Logistic Regression Models’ of Justices Votes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Justices Justices on ISC for Full Time Period
Arbel -0.012 -0.012 -0.014 -0.008 -0.008 -0.011
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Barak 0.078 0.012 0.010
(0.068) (0.041) (0.041)
Beinisch -0.009 -0.027 -0.038* -0.008 -0.021 -0.030
(0.029) (0.025) (0.021) (0.030) (0.028) (0.024)
Berliner -0.015 -0.016 -0.020
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Elon -0.038 -0.039 -0.031
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Fogelman -0.037 -0.037 -0.039
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Grunis 0.016 0.009 0.006 0.018 0.013 0.010
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
Hayut 0.044 0.039 0.039 0.048 0.045 0.043
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
Joubran -0.009 -0.012 -0.008 -0.006 -0.008 -0.006
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Kheshin, D. 0.004 0.004 0.010
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Levy -0.027* -0.032** -0.028* -0.026 -0.029* -0.027*
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Melcer -0.040 -0.042 -0.035
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
Naor 0.110*** 0.099** 0.092** 0.115*** 0.107*** 0.100***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039)
Procaccia 0.029 0.014 0.005 0.034 0.022 0.015
(0.035) (0.034) (0.031) (0.036) (0.036) (0.033)
Rivlin -0.017 -0.031 -0.031 -0.016 -0.026 -0.027
(0.030) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029)
Female defendant 0.172** 0.173** 0.176** 0.170* 0.170* 0.172*
(0.086) (0.088) (0.088) (0.087) (0.088) (0.088)
Sentence-only appeal 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.056***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Panel seniority (square root) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Panel workload -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 3,972 3,972 3,972 3,012 3,012 3,012
Chi-squared prob. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Prob. female justice coefficients
jointly = 0
0.005 0.008 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.004
Prob. acting justice coefficients
jointly = 0
0.258 0.508 0.549
Note: Prob. = probability. Dependent variable is 1 if a justice’s vote favored the defendant and 0 if it favored the state.
A vote favors the state if it is to affirm an appeal brought by a defendant or to reverse an appeal brought by the state.
A vote favors the defendant if it is to affirm an appeal brought by the state or to reverse an appeal brought by the
defendant. All models include dummy variables for offense categories. Justice Rubinstein is the reference justice for
justice dummy variables. Robust standard errors, clustered at the case level, are in parentheses. ***p < 0.01;
**p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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sample to those justices who sat on the ISC for the full period of our study. This assures that
the justices all had the same pool of cases to which they might be assigned.
All models include a set of dummy variables for offense categories. The dummy
variables represent the first major offense subject, as described in Table 4, referred to in the
Court’s opinion, except that if any offense mentioned in the opinion was murder, rape, or
offenses against another’s freedom, a dummy variable was used for those offenses. This
coding assured that the most serious crimes were represented in the criminal offense
coding. The regression coefficients for the 13 offense categories are reported in Appendix
Table C.82
The results shown for each coefficient are the marginal effects and are interpretable
as the change in the probability of voting for a defendant given a change in an indicator
variable from 0 to 1. Justice Rubinstein, who Table 12 shows has a rate of voting for
defendants closest to the Court’s overall average of 15.8 percent, is the reference category
for the justice dummy variables. A positive sign for a justice’s coefficient indicates that the
justice was more likely than Justice Rubinstein to vote for the defendant. A negative sign
indicates that the justice was more likely than Justice Rubinstein to vote for the state.
Therefore, for example, the -0.027 coefficient for Justice Levy in Model (1) of Table 17 is
interpretable as his being 2.7 percent more likely to vote for the state than Justice Rubin-
stein, holding constant the other variables in the model.
a. Individual Justices. The difference in probability of a vote favoring a defendant between
the justices with the largest positive and negative effects is substantial. The difference in
probability between Justice Naor (with a positive coefficient of about 10 or 11 percent) and
Justices Fogelman, Elon, andMelcer (each with similarly sized negative coefficients of about
4 percent) is about 15 percent, significant at p < 0.01 in Models (1) to (3) of Table 17. A
defendant’s chance of a favorable vote thus is materially affected by the justices drawn to sit
on the case. This is consistent with the variation shown in Table 12 and with the variation
in panel outcomes shown in Table 15. Other significant differences exist between pairs
of justices.
b. Female Justices. The models also allow further exploration of the female justice effect
suggested by Tables 13 and 16. As Table 17’s penultimate row shows, the female justice
coefficients were consistently jointly statistically significant. In models that replace the
individual justice dummy variables with a female justice dummy variable, the female
justice effect is 2 to 3 percent. But excluding Justice Naor from the group yields consis-
tently insignificant results for the five other female justices. It would be questionable to
claim a gender effect sensitive to the inclusion of a single justice. Revisiting Table 16’s
panel-level results, exclusion of Justice Naor again leads to no significant female justice
effect.
82In additional models not reported here, we used a different set of dummy variables for offense categories. In those
models, the dummy variables represent the first major offense subject, as described in Table 4, referred to in the
Court’s opinion, without substitution in cases in which the second or third offense referred to was murder, rape, or
offenses against another’s freedom.
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Both the small number of female justices and the process of selecting justices also
suggest caution in interpreting any gender effect. Interpreting judicial characteristic effects
is subject to the limitation that judges are not randomly selected to serve on the Court. So
a judicial characteristic effect, such as gender, is conditional on being selected to serve on
the ISC. It is not an effect necessarily generalizable to other female or male judges.
c. Presiding Justices. In models not reported here, we confirm the effect, noted above, of
increased votes against defendants when Justice Levy was the presiding justice. The coeffi-
cient on a dummy variable for Justice Levy as the presiding justice is highly statistically
significant, negative, and suggests an increased probability of voting for the state of about
6 percent. A similar effect was not found for other presiding justices.
d. Acting Justices. As noted in Section II, some research suggests that acting justices behave
differently than permanent justices, and Table 13 shows a significant acting justice effect.
But in regression models, not reported here, that include a variable for acting justice status,
the acting justice variable is not consistently significant. Table 17’s last row reports tests of
the hypothesis that the acting justice dummy variables are jointly equal to 0 and shows that
one cannot reject the hypothesis. The initial acting justice effect in Table 13 appears to be
an artifact of not controlling for the differences in case assignment and the changes in the
makeup of the ISC during the period of our study. The acting justices were added to the
Court during our time period; they saw a different mix of cases than most of the permanent
justices, and this could lead to a spurious effect. In this respect, our results confirm Hall’s
observation that Sunstein et al.’s U.S. judicial ideology results are questionable in part
because they do not account for the changing composition of courts as judges retire and are
replaced.83 The models in Columns (4) through (6) of Table 17 exclude the justices who
were not on the ISC for the full two years of our study. Each of our principal effects is stable
with only minor changes in coefficient size or significance.
e. Female Defendants. The models consistently show strong, significant female defendant
effects, with female defendants about 17 percent more likely to receive a favorable vote.
In a separate study, we showed that female defendants also fared better than did male
defendants at the screening level in discretionary jurisdiction cases.84 As noted in Section
VI.A.2, interpreting this finding is difficult due to limitations that we cannot fully control for
given our data.
f. Sentence-Only Versus Non-Sentence-Only Cases. Because sentence-only cases are frequent and
evidence exists that they are not randomly assigned, we examined each justice’s pattern of
votes for sentence-only cases and other cases. Justices Barak’s and Grunis’s patterns signifi-
cantly differed, with a much higher rate of votes favoring defendants in sentence-only cases.
83Hall, supra note 1, at 578.
84Eisenberg et al., supra note 31.
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For Justice Barak, the rate was 42.9 percent compared to 4.6 percent in other cases
(p = 0.004); for Justice Grunis, the rate was 25.5 percent compared to 8.5 percent
(p = 0.008). No justice who served in both years of the study significantly differed in rates
across the two years. In regression models, not reported here, limited to non-sentence-only
cases, the differences between the justices most and least favorable to defendants was larger
than the difference for the pooled sample of sentence-only and non-sentence-only cases
reported in Table 17. The difference between Justices Naor and Fogelman in the probabil-
ity of a vote for defendants was consistently about 24 percent. In sentence-only cases, this
difference was about 12 percent. But even in sentence-only cases, Justice Naor was signifi-
cantly different (p = 0.02 or less) from Justices Elon, Fogelman, Levy, and Melcer. In
sentence-only cases, Justice Levy was consistently about 4 percent less likely to vote for
defendants than was Justice Rubinstein and Justice Elon was about 6 percent less likely.
Both results were highly statistically significant. The female defendant coefficient has a
positive sign in the separate sets of cases but was significant only in sentence-only cases.
B. Jurisdictional Source and Perceptions of Justices’ Preferences
Estimates of individual justices’ voting patterns in Section VI.A address behavior in the mass
of appealed criminal cases. These estimates are unaffected by justices’ case selection criteria
because jurisdiction is mandatory. Such individual justice behavior in the mass of cases is
rarely observable in courts of last resort with discretionary jurisdiction because the courts’
selection activity consists of unpublicized decisions to grant or deny review. Justices’ votes
are observed only in cases that survive this selection mechanism. And the pattern of case
outcomes materially differs between the selected cases and the mass of cases. Reversal rates
are much higher in cases selected for review.85 Because our data include votes on the merits
in both mandatory jurisdiction cases and in cases selected via discretionary jurisdiction, we
can illuminate the reliability of characterizing judges’ tendencies based on cases they select.
A discussion of the ISC discretionary jurisdiction case selection process and its outcomes
appears in earlier work.86
Table 18 reports each justice’s rate of voting for the state in mandatory and discre-
tionary cases, as well as their rank order of voting for the state in both types of cases.87 The
justices are sorted in ascending order of rate of voting for defendants in mandatory cases,
as reported in the first numerical column. The results are striking. Justice Fogelman, who
is most favorable to the state in mandatory cases, is tied for least favorable to the state in
discretionary cases. Justice Naor, who is most favorable to defendants in mandatory cases,
is tied for the second least favorable to defendants in discretionary cases.
One hesitates to make much of these two results because these justices were involved
in so few discretionary cases, a consequence of the highly selective discretionary case
85Eisenberg et al., Cornell, supra note 33.
86Eisenberg et al., supra note 31.
87About 2.4 percent of discretionary jurisdiction criminal case votes are excluded because they involved votes that we
did not characterize as favoring the defendant or the state.
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screening process.88 However, the observer of a discretionary jurisdiction court would
observe only the equivalent of these cases. Similar inconsistency emerges if one focuses on
the justice who decided the most discretionary cases. Justice Levy, the justice who partici-
pated in the most criminal cases, ranks fourth most favorable to the state in mandatory
cases, but 12th most favorable to the state in discretionary cases. Of the four justices with at
least 15 discretionary case outcomes, Justice Levy ranked most favorable to the state in
mandatory cases and least favorable to the state in discretionary cases. More formal analysis
establishes that the justices’ ranks in voting for defendants or the state are uncorre-
lated across jurisdictional source. We can reject the hypothesis that the justices’ ranks
across mandatory and discretionary criminal cases are equal (Wilcoxon signed-rank test
p = 0.046).
The absence of correlation is shown visually in Figure 2. The figure’s x-axis is a
justice’s ordinal rank in mandatory cases, with a lower numbered rank corresponding to
voting more favorably for the state. The y-axis is a justice’s ordinal rank in discretionary
cases. The number under each justice’s name is the number of discretionary jurisdiction
cases with a definitive appellate outcome. As Table 18 shows, Justices Fogelman and Naor
88Eisenberg et al., supra note 31.
Table 18: Rate and Rank of Justices’ Voting for Defendant by Jurisdictional Source
Justice
Mandatory Cases Discretionary Cases
Justice’s Mandatory
Case Rank
Justice’s Discretionary
Case Rank
Rate Favoring
Defendant N
Rate Favoring
Defendant N
Fogelman 0.12 168 1.00 4 1 13
Elon 0.13 167 0.80 5 2 4
Melcer 0.13 86 1.00 3 2 13
Levy 0.14 829 0.87 23 4 12
Rivlin 0.14 142 0.80 5 4 4
Arbel 0.15 351 0.82 17 6 8
Berliner 0.15 274 0.60 5 6 2
Joubran 0.16 446 0.80 20 8 4
Rubinstein 0.16 434 0.85 20 8 10
Beinisch 0.17 150 0.57 7 10 1
Kheshin, D. 0.17 195 0.80 5 10 4
Procaccia 0.19 138 0.85 13 12 10
Grunis 0.20 169 1.00 5 13 13
Hayut 0.21 215 0.83 6 14 9
Barak 0.23 43 1.00 1 15 13
Naor 0.28 154 0.60 5 16 2
Note: The table shows the rate at which each justice voted for the state’s position in mandatory and discretionary
criminal cases. A vote favors the state if it is to affirm an appeal brought by a defendant or to reverse an appeal brought
by the state. A vote favors the defendant if it is to affirm an appeal brought by the state or to reverse an appeal brought
by the defendant. The last two columns show the ordinal rank of each justice for mandatory and discretionary
criminal cases. The ordinal rank is based on the rate at which justices vote for the state in criminal cases, with a lower
rank number corresponding to voting more favorably for the state.
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differ sharply in their rank across the two jurisdictional sources. Justice Levy’s location in
the upper-left quadrant of the figure suggests that even the justice who adjudicated the
most criminal cases would be perceived to have different preferences if observed only in
discretionary cases.
VII. Limitations
Notwithstanding our efforts to account for case assignment, the data are observational and
the results are subject to limitations. Mandatory criminal cases may have additional char-
acteristics that are not randomly distributed but that affect case outcomes. And the process
by which appeals terminate before a decision on the merits cannot be fully accounted for
by our data. Appellants may file notices of appeal and then settle or withdraw cases before
the Court adjudicates them.
Our seniority and workload variables are composed of justices’ characteristics and
thus are correlated with individual justice dummy variables. This promotes multicollinearity
and can raise problems of endogeneity. In Table 17’s models we used panel-level compos-
ites of seniority and workload to minimize multicollinearity. These problems cannot be fully
Figure 2: Ranking in discretionary and mandatory criminal cases.
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Note: The figure shows the ordinal rank of justices as measured by the rate at which they vote for the state in criminal
cases, with a lower rank number corresponding to voting more favorably for the state. A vote favors the state if it is to
affirm an appeal brought by a defendant or to reverse an appeal brought by the state. A vote favors the defendant if
it is to affirm an appeal brought by the state or to reverse an appeal brought by the defendant. The number under
each justice’s name is the number of discretionary cases in which the justice participated that had an outcome
favoring the defendant or the state.
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eliminated but are not a concern in Models (1) and (4), which do not contain seniority and
workload controls, and yield results similar to the models that do.89
Another concern is that available data do not fully measure workload. But we do have
reasonable estimates of the workload for appellate cases. We lack the time information for
a similar estimate of the workload in HCJ cases, but that may not be a serious problem. If
the ISC tries to equalize justices’ workloads across all justice activities, then our measure of
the appellate case load is implicit information about the rest of the justices’ workload. If in
fact Justice A has, for example, only 4 percent of the appellate court workload because of
easy cases or specialization in nonappellate areas, then the ISC goal would be for Justice A
to have had a larger share of the nonappellate court workload. The 4 percent appellate
workload tells us that Justice A should have had a larger share of the nonappellate work-
load. We do not need an actual measure of the nonappellate workload. We are interested
in workload to the extent it influences the probability of Justice A being assigned cases. The
4 percent workload we observe should give us that information. So we effectively account
for the nonappellate workload on the assumption of the ISC seeking to impose equal
burdens on justices. If there is no goal of an equal burden, then workload is of reduced
importance. The fact that Justice A is very busy with other matters would no longer
substantially influence the probability of him being assigned a case.
VIII. Conclusion
An ideal condition for assessing judge effects would be completely random case assignment,
without the variations for which we have tried to account. However, this ideal likely does not
correspond to an ideal real-world ISC. The ISC is an incredibly busy court and good reason
exists to exploit expertise and experience and to seek to distribute the workload. A court
structured like the ISC cannot be expected to seek or achieve complete random assign-
ment. An alternative ideal situation would be to have an accurate measure of the merits of
each case. Excellent control of the merits would preclude the need for random assignment
to assess judge effects. Variables controlling for the merits are sometimes available90 but the
cost of collecting them is high, and debate about the merits of cases likely not completely
resolvable. So we are left with nonrandom aspects of case assignment and no objective
assessment of the merits of cases. These limitations suggest that something along the lines
89We have explored other models, using the seniority of the presiding justice as the measure of seniority for a case.
Significant justice effects remain but standard errors deteriorate as expected.
90Theodore Eisenberg, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L. Waters, G. Thomas Munsterman, Stewart
J. Schwab & Martin T. Wells, Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven and Zeisel’s The
American Jury, 2 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 171 (2005) (variables included judge, jury, and lawyer views of the strength
of the evidence). Ex post assessment of the merits is sometimes possible in medical malpractice cases due to the
availability of documented information about the case and expert reviewers. But even here the merits of behavior can
be debated. Tom Baker, Reconsidering the Harvard Medical Practice Study Conclusions About the Validity of Medi-
cal Malpractice Claims, 33 J. L., Med. & Ethics 501 (2005); Philip G. Peters, Jr., What We Know About Malpractice
Settlements, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 1783 (2007).
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of our analysis may approach the limit of what is realistically achievable in studying ISC or
similar judges.
We have documented nonrandom aspects of case assignment, including case cat-
egory and seniority. After accounting for these factors, we find significant judge effects.
Although the eye-catching result may be interjudge differences, the dominant reality is
overall similarity. Any group of 16 different people likely will vary in their voting tendencies.
The range of voting patterns we observe, although unlikely to arise by chance, is not
shockingly broad. Substantial interjustice agreement in the mass of mandatory jurisdiction
appeals is consistent with other studies of the mass of cases that find little or no judge or
judicial characteristic effects.91
Finding no association between justices’ ordinal rankings across mandatory and
discretionary cases has important implications. The finding affects many studies of judicial
preferences in courts in which judges’ votes to select cases are not observed. For example,
studies of U.S. Supreme Court justices’ preferences are conditional on the cases selected.
The studies may not accurately portray justices’ preferences because they do not account
for the mass of cases that justices review.
Appendix
Table A: Detailed Subjects of First Crime Mentioned in ISC Opinions
Major Subject of Crime N
Type of Crime Within Major
Subject of Crime N
Specific Clause Relating
to Crime Within Type of Crime N
National security,
foreign affairs,
official state
secrets—1
18 Treason—14 13
Causing damages to the armed
forces of the state—15
0
Espionage—16 5
Exposure of official state
secretes—17
0
Threat to foreign relations—18 0
Offenses against
the regime and
the society—2
63 Weapon crimes, hate crimes—19 39
Forbidden unionizing—20 0
Interference to public safety—21 0
Insults directed to hurt religious
feelings—22
0
Causing public harm—23 18
Prostitution and abomination—24 6
Nuisances—25 0
Illegal gambling—26 0
Other—27 0
Offenses against
the government
and the legal
system—3
16 Disruption of proceedings—28 9
Crimes evasion—29 0
Assaulting police officers—30 7
91Ashenfelter et al., supra note 1; Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Judicial Study of Class Action Settlements and Their Fee
Awards, 7 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 811 (2010); Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind:
An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1337 (1998); Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson &
Ryon Lancaster, Individual Justice or Collective Legal Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the
Post Civil Rights United States, 7 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 175, 188 (2010).
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Table A Continued
Major Subject of Crime N
Type of Crime Within Major
Subject of Crime N
Specific Clause Relating
to Crime Within Type of Crime N
Offenses against
good
governance—4
6 Offenses relating to public
servants—31
2 Fraud and breach of trust—59 2
Other—60 0
Bribery—32 4
Body injuries—5 765 Causing death—33 170 Manslaughter—61 74
Murder—62 52
Attempted murder—63 22
Causing death by negligence—64 20
Other—65 2
Forbidden abortion—34 0
Responsibility for the safety of
others—35
3
Endangering the life and health of
others—36
271 Bodily harm in aggravating
circumstances—66
86
Risking life in transport path—67 69
Causing injuries/harm in
regular/aggravating
circumstances—68
112
Other—69 4
Sex offenses—37 228 Rape—70 91
Rape or sodomy within the
family—71
36
Prohibited sexual intercourse
(with consent)—72
4
Sodomy—73 35
Sexual relations between therapist
and patient—74
2
Indecent act + indecent act in
public—75
58
Sexual harassment—76 1
Unknown 1
Offenses against minors and
seniors—38
16
Offenses against another’s
freedom—39
40 Abduction, false
imprisonment—77
23
Slavery and human trafficking—78 17
Assault—40 37
Property crimes—6 236 Larceny—41 17
Quasi-larceny—42 0
Robbery—43 135
Burglary housebreaking—44 6
Possession of stolen property—45 0
Property offenses regarding
vehicles—46
14
Deception, blackmail, and
exploitation—47
43
Fraud—48 2
Trespassing—49 0
Property damage—50 19
Forgery of
currency and
stamps—7
0
Minor offenses—8 0
Preparation and
conspiracy to
commit a
crime—9
101
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Table A Continued
Major Subject of Crime N
Type of Crime Within Major
Subject of Crime N
Specific Clause Relating
to Crime Within Type of Crime N
White-collar
crimes—10
13 Money laundering—51 3
Offenses regarding securities—52 0
Antitrust offenses—53 7
Tax offenses—54 3
Drugs—11 82 Manufacturing drugs and
possession of drugs—55
40 Manufacturing or producing
drugs—79
0
Possession and use of drugs—80 40
Trading and transferring
drugs—56
42
Instigation of a minor—57 0
Other—58 0
Administrative
offenses—12
0
Other offenses—13 13
No information in
opinion
97
Total 1410
Note: The table shows the number times each offense category was the first offense mentioned in an ISC opinion in
mandatory criminal cases. The numbers in the crime designation columns are internal coding references.
Table B: Justices’ Participation on Appellate Merits Panels by Type of Case and
Jurisdictional Source
Justice
Discretionary Jurisdiction Mandatory Jurisdiction
Criminal Civil Criminal Civil Total
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Arbel 28 2.5 120 23.3 377 9.0 112 6.7 637 8.5
Barak 3 0.3 4 0.8 47 1.1 39 2.3 93 1.2
Beinisch 16 1.4 2 0.4 155 3.7 40 2.4 213 2.8
Berliner 13 1.2 5 1.0 283 6.8 66 3.9 367 4.9
Elon 6 0.5 27 5.2 179 4.3 92 5.5 304 4.1
Fogelman 8 0.7 2 0.4 182 4.3 30 1.8 222 3.0
Grunis 15 1.4 18 3.5 183 4.4 200 11.9 416 5.5
Hayut 15 1.4 8 1.6 227 5.4 235 14.0 485 6.5
Joubran 436 39.3 41 7.9 462 11.0 116 6.9 1,055 14.1
Kheshin, D. 11 1.0 12 2.3 205 4.9 61 3.6 289 3.9
Levy 479 43.2 5 1.0 862 20.6 36 2.1 1,382 18.4
Melcer 4 0.4 1 0.2 89 2.1 44 2.6 138 1.8
Naor 8 0.7 17 3.3 163 3.9 168 10.0 356 4.7
Other 3 0.3 1 0.2 31 0.7 24 1.4 59 0.8
Procaccia 19 1.7 30 5.8 145 3.5 86 5.1 280 3.7
Rivlin 7 0.6 79 15.3 151 3.6 212 12.6 449 6.0
Rubinstein 38 3.4 144 27.9 450 10.7 119 7.1 751 10.0
Total 1,109 100 516 100 4,191 100 1,680 100 7,496 100
Note: For each jurisdictional source (discretionary and mandatory) and type of case (criminal and civil), the first
column is the number of votes on the merits cast by the row justice and the second column is the percent of votes cast
by that justice in cases of the source and type. The percents are thus column percents. For example, Justice Arbel cast
28 of 1,109 of the votes on the merits in discretionary criminal cases, and the second column shows that to be 2.5
percent of the votes cast in such cases.
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Table C: Logistic Regression Models’ of Justices Votes, Showing Coefficients for Criminal
Offense Categories
(1) (2) (3)
Arbel -0.012 -0.012 -0.014
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Barak 0.078 0.012 0.010
(0.068) (0.041) (0.041)
Beinisch -0.009 -0.027 -0.038*
(0.029) (0.025) (0.021)
Berliner -0.015 -0.016 -0.020
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Elon -0.038 -0.039 -0.031
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Fogelman -0.037 -0.037 -0.039
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
Grunis 0.016 0.009 0.006
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
Hayut 0.044 0.039 0.039
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
Joubran -0.009 -0.012 -0.008
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Kheshin, D. 0.004 0.004 0.010
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Levy -0.027* -0.032** -0.028*
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Melcer -0.040 -0.042 -0.035
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
Naor 0.110*** 0.099** 0.092**
(0.040) (0.039) (0.038)
Procaccia 0.029 0.014 0.005
(0.035) (0.034) (0.031)
Rivlin -0.017 -0.031 -0.031
(0.030) (0.027) (0.027)
Female defendant 0.172** 0.173** 0.176**
(0.086) (0.088) (0.088)
Sentence only appealed 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.059***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Panel seniority (square root) 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Panel workload -0.002
(0.002)
National security, foreign affairs, official state secrets 0.116 0.117 0.126
(0.122) (0.124) (0.126)
Offenses against the regime and the society -0.029 -0.024 -0.023
(0.056) (0.059) (0.059)
Offenses against the government and the legal system 0.202 0.215 0.226
(0.145) (0.151) (0.153)
Body injuries other than murder, rape, and offenses
against another’s freedom
-0.052 -0.048 -0.045
(0.048) (0.050) (0.051)
Property crimes -0.009 -0.006 -0.004
(0.051) (0.053) (0.054)
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Table C Continued
(1) (2) (3)
Preparation and conspiracy to commit a crime 0.003 0.006 0.012
(0.059) (0.062) (0.064)
White-collar crimes 0.173 0.189 0.199
(0.208) (0.216) (0.220)
Drugs -0.048 -0.044 -0.043
(0.049) (0.052) (0.053)
Other offenses -0.055 -0.052 -0.051
(0.075) (0.078) (0.078)
No information in opinion 0.177* 0.183* 0.186*
(0.094) (0.098) (0.099)
Rape -0.016 -0.013 -0.011
(0.054) (0.056) (0.057)
Offenses against another’s freedom -0.091** -0.089** -0.087*
(0.043) (0.045) (0.046)
Observations 3,972 3,972 3,972
Chi-squared probability 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: Dependent variable is 1 if a justice’s vote favored the defendant and 0 if it favored the state. A vote favors the
state if it is to affirm an appeal brought by a defendant or to reverse an appeal brought by the state. A vote favors the
defendant if it is to affirm an appeal brought by the state or to reverse an appeal brought by the defendant. Murder
is the reference category for offense categories. Robust standard errors, clustered at the case level, are in parentheses.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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